


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Absolute Idealism and Immortality

By

JESSE WINECOFFE BALL

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LINCOLN, NEBRASKA
1907

Absolute Idealism and Immortality

By

JESSE WINECOFFE BALL

A Thesis presented to the graduate faculty of the University of Nebraska in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA
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FOREWORD

This thesis claims to be no more than its title indicates, a discussion of the problem of immortality from the standpoint of absolute idealism. Or rather it is an attempt to evaluate the motives in absolute idealism which have a bearing upon the doctrine of immortality, whether negative or affirmative. It therefore does not aim at presenting the historical or the theological argument for immortality, but confines itself to the metaphysical.

Certain currents of recent thought, mainly naturalistic, make such a discussion timely. The trend of naturalistic science has revealed a decided tendency to cast doubt upon the persistence of personality after death if not to discredit it altogether. It is impossible to be wholly indifferent to discussions which would invalidate the most cherished beliefs of mankind. An examination of the foundation principles upon which the sciences themselves rest, reveals the fact that these display the leadership of certain regulative ideals, that science at bottom rests upon faith, although, indeed, upon the thoroughly rational belief that the world displays the activity of a Mind whose thoughts we are permitted to interpret. The belief in immortality is similarly grounded and in its influence upon mankind equally displays the ultimate Reality. Our governing ideals are among the most real things in life. Among those ideals is the historic, the universal belief in immortality.

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of many helpful suggestions in the preparation of this thesis from Prof. E. L. Hinman, Prof. of Logic and Metaphysics, in the University of Nebraska.

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ABSOLUTE IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

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INTRODUCTION:

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

A

THE STANDPOINT OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

I. Its hold upon the philosophic world. Its indebtedness to Hegel and its independence of him. Its contest with naturalism and general sympathy with the historic culture concepts. Its power to discuss an idealistic concept by analyzing the implications of positive science and by thus showing the idealistic conception in question as affirmatively involved in the world as known.

II. Its logical structure. Its monism, "concrete," "spiritualistic," "concrete universal," "organic unity." Its warfare on abstractions. Its recognition of the ideality of finite consciousness. The leadership of the universal in science, art, ethics and religion. Ultimate Reality interpreted in terms of the absolute reading of our finite consciousness. Degrees of reality.

I. *Its hold upon the philosophic world.*

The influence of a system of thought upon any age may be due either directly to the system itself, or indirectly to its general point of view. The system itself usually bears in a marked degree the peculiarities of its founder. The general point of view, however, is apt to have wider relations to the general development of thought which the founder of the system has succeeded in bringing to a focus.

1. Absolute idealism traces its descent from the philosophy of Hegel. It would be a mistake, however, to identify it fully with the system of Hegel; for in adopting this general point of view it by no means adopted the details of his system in their entirety. It has, on the contrary, developed a considerable degree of independence of its founder. In Germany the Hegelian system took root at once. But presently it gave rise to conflicting parties. In the controversies which thus arose over the application of its principles in particular directions the special significance of the Hegelian point of view was largely lost. In England and America it has exerted a greater influence.¹ It was introduced into England by Dr. Hutchison

¹See *The Hegelian Point of View*, by J. S. Mackenzie, *Mind*, n. s. p. 54 ff.

Stirling who sought to propagate the system as a whole. Few of the later exponents of the Hegelian tendency followed him in this respect. Wallace did more than any other to render the works of Hegel accessible to English readers, but he dealt with him, not so much as the maker of a system, as one who brought out certain large ideas and modes of treatment. T. H. Green is justly regarded as having been a leading representative of Hegelian thought, yet he too was far from being a close adherent of the Hegelian system. The same remark holds true of Edward Caird and F. H. Bradley. Bosanquet has followed Hegel more closely. His general attitude, however, is that of one who has absorbed certain leading ideas of the Hegelian standpoint, but has used them with considerable freedom in his own way. These men have been leaders in the philosophical thought of recent times, and may all be classed as exponents of absolut idealism in one form or another. On this side of the Atlantic the name of Royce is probably more conspicuous than that of any other in the circles of philosophy. With him may be ranked Morris, Watson and Taylor, all of whom are representatives of this same school of thought.

It has commonly been assumed that an important distinction between German and English speculation has been the appeal of the latter to experience. This, it is now generally admitted, does not accurately point out the difference; for it would be difficult to find systems of philosophy that make a more emphatic appeal to experience than do those of Kant and Hegel. The point of difference lies rather in the emphasis of German thought upon the reality of the universal as expressing the element of identity in difference. In contrast with this there is to be found in English speculation what has been regarded as a disintegrating atomism, attaining a constructive result in Hobbes and a sceptical result in Hume.¹ It should be pointed out, likewise, that this recognition of the universal in more recent English thought, due to German influence, has brought about a remodeling of the treatment hitherto given to certain fundamental questions in logic, in psychology, in ethics and in political philosophy. In logic this result has been accomplished by Bosanquet and others, following the lead of Bradley. In psychology a similar result has followed the labors of Ward and

¹Mackenzie, J. S. *The Hegelian Point of View.* Mind, n. s. p. 58.

Stout. In political philosophy the works of Green, Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet have been produced from the same standpoint. The same remark applies to the works of Green, Mackenzie, Muirhead and a considerable number of others in the field of ethics.

The influence of a school is, however, not confined to its direct representatives. It may be extended by other men who, while agreeing with it in the main, have been found among its sharpest critics. And this has frequently happened in the history of thought. The attitude of Lotze toward the philosophy of Hegel was precisely this. He is found in sharp antagonism to it at times, and yet his own system of metaphysics has much in common with that of Hegel. Both directly and indirectly therefore, it has come about that absolute idealism has exerted a ruling influence over a large part of the philosophic world.

2. Two features of this system are worthy of special mention here. It has, on the one hand, conducted a vigorous contest with naturalism on account of the attempt of the latter to explain all events and phenomena in terms of mechanism. No such explanation, it contends, can ever be adequate or satisfying. But while mechanism is freely recognized by idealism, it is also pointed out that mechanism is always found in the service of larger ends and purposes. In respect of these idealism also contends that naturalism has no sufficient explanation. On the other hand absolute idealism early disclosed a genuine and profound appreciation of the culture concepts that have been historic in developing civilization. It has uniformly displayed a keen interest not only in science, but also in art, ethics and religion. Its genius is that of evolution in the best sense, not of revolution.

3. From the outset the idealism of Kant and of the Kantian school recognized the mind-given elements in the grouping of phenomena and in the development of science. But for the Kantian the deeper meaning of the phenomena is unknown. We know things as they appear, we cannot know them as they are in themselves. The physical world was therefore given over to the mechanical categories of the understanding, which admittedly are powerless to apprehend things in their inner meaning. In the sphere of the practical reason or morals, however, it was maintained that we come directly upon the noumenal

world as opposed to the phenomenal. For the practical reason there are directly given certain postulates which theoretical reason can neither demonstrate nor deny. These postulates are native to reason. They are grounded in the moral nature, and essential to its complete expression. These postulates are God, freedom, and immortality.

To this arbitrary breaking up of philosophy and throwing all that pertains to the natural world over into the unknown, the absolute idealist is decidedly opposed. Neither can the activities of the mind be so sharply separated and placed over against each other. The absolute idealist, therefore, seeks a closer analysis of the implications of science and aims to show that the higher and more speculative categories of idealism are directly and affirmatively involved in the world as known. They are in fact the very conditions of its being known. Therefore absolute idealism does not turn over to naturalism the whole world of intelligible experience, meanwhile seeking to conserve in some other way the higher cultural values, or to recoup itself in some transcendental world affirmed for practical reason alone. On the contrary it enters directly into the very structure of science. It aims to show that nature is in fact unintelligible until the higher categories of idealism have received their due; for these, it claims, are no less significant for natural science than for ethics, religion, or art.

II. *Its logical structure.*

1. Attention has already been drawn to the common characteristic of German idealistic philosophy that of its recognition of the dominant influence of the universal within experience. If it is the merit of German philosophy in general to have brought out the significance of the true universal, it is the merit of Hegel in particular to have laid chief emphasis upon the concreteness of the universal, to point out its living relation to the whole, in short to bring into prominence the solidarity of experience. This, the goal of his dialectic method, rather than the method itself constitutes Hegel's chief value for present day thought.

Kant, in bringing out the importance of the thought element in experience had in effect left sensation outside the range of thought. Its office was to furnish the materials for thought.

to work upon. On the other hand, things-in-themselves were even more beyond the range of thought activity and inaccessible to it. The intellectual element in experience was in this way rendered mainly formal. Its business was considered to be that of bringing the particulars, accumulated through sense-perception, into the unity of thought. Hegel, on the other hand, took an entirely different view of the matter. The manifold of sense in the meaning of Kant he did not admit. In consequence he did not regard the task of thought to bring unity into it, or to make experience one. For him it is already one. The office of thought is to bring out the systematic connection implicit in experience. From this standpoint it will readily be seen that the universals which have value for us are principles which arise out of the materials of experience, not any abstract formal principles brought to it. These principles absolute idealism seeks to discover and to bring to suitable recognition. This style of thinking has a direct connection with that of Kant. It has even been supposed that this was what Kant himself was really aiming at. But his doctrine of the structure of knowledge, namely that it is the work of thought to bring into unity, by means of categories discovered through analysis of the judgment, the various disconnected materials supplied by the senses, led to quite a different result. He was led to introduce the imagination as a mediating faculty between the contrasted elements of sense and those of thought. A closer study led Hegel to reject this whole line of treatment of the problem of knowledge. The Kantian manifold of sense seemed to him mythical. Pure sense without an admixture of thought he declared to be "for us thinking beings as good as nothing". But in rejecting the Kantian view that the sense materials are independent of thought until thought brings order and unity into them, Hegel necessarily adopted also a different conception of the office of thought itself. He therefore came to regard the work of thought as that of interpretation, rather than that of construction. For absolute idealism in general, then, "sense and thought are no longer opposed except as implicit and explicit; and so the work of thought becomes, in a sense, analytic rather than synthetic—or rather both at once".¹

¹Mackenzie, J. S. *The Hegelian Point of View*. *Mind*, n. s. vol. 11, p. 64.

This does not mean that the sense element has lost its significance or that it has disappeared. The Hegelian position has, it is true, sometimes been so understood, but unjustly. It means that within the elements supplied by sense, as in all others, there are involved universal determinations that can not be interpreted except in the light of thought.

This distinction between Kant and Hegel is involved also in their respective views of the world of phenomena and of the world of things-in-themselves. The ground of opposition between the world of phenomena and the world of things-in-themselves lay in the opposition between the sense element and the thought element. If, however, the universal principles of thought are traceable in the materials furnished by sense-experience it is evident that there is nothing excluded from thought's dominion. Some things may indeed be out of the present range of our thinking, so that they are not immediately grasped, but from this it does not follow that they are totally beyond the domain of thought. From the Hegelian standpoint, therefore, thought is conceived as "the real world rising to consciousness of itself, not as a more or less foreign power imposing its laws on a partially subjected territory".¹ Absolute idealism is, therefore, monistic in structure. The ultimately real is an organic unity, of which the most characteristic type is mind. The all-pervading thought in which the ideals and purposes, which constitute the center and truth of things, inhere and which supplies their structural basis finds its unity in the Absolute.

2. Accordingly the finite consciousness finds in itself the same ideals which it discovers in the world of physical nature and of organic life. It discovers these because of the leadership of the ideals within itself. Because of this fact also science in the first instance is possible. Even half-unconsciously men have assumed in the construction of science that the world exhibits rational order, and that the laws governing the movements of things, or promoting growth and decay, are capable of interpretation by the human mind. The successful building up of the various sciences, therefore, fully justifies our confidence in the rational order inherent in things. Nay, if this analysis be correct, it would appear to involve the admission that absolute

¹Mackenzie, J. S. *The Hegelian Point of View*. Mind, n. s. vol. 11, p. 65.

idealism is the logical foundation of the sciences, that, in short, their very existence furnishes the most cogent evidence of the truth and vitality of an absolute ideal at work in human consciousness.

Art, likewise, not less than science, is prompted by the leadership of the universal; for it is not merely the copying of that which exists. It is more. It seeks in the copy to idealize and perfect that which in the object exists but imperfectly. Thus the painter selects the finest features of his subject and endeavors to present them in ideal form. The sculptor strives toward a type, and that the perfect type, rarely if ever realized outside his art and hardly with perfection even there, so imperfectly do the materials with which he works yield to his purposes.

Ethics no less finds itself to be the embodiment of a system of universals which have as their aim the highest expression of character and conduct. Within conscience there speaks, indeed, the voice of organized human society, but over and above this, the voice of the Eternal.

Equally with these and more than these religion is the striving after the ideal. It is the craving for fellowship with the author of our being, a voice in the dark it may be, as of

"An infant crying for the light
And with no language but a cry."

It is the call of the ideal within man, the craving for that which is highest and holiest, for fellowship with the divine.

From the determining influence of the ideal along these various lines it becomes evident that any development of science which appears to militate against idealistic conceptions is moving wide of the mark and failing utterly to give a truly adequate interpretation of the real.

3. Taking the ideality of our finite consciousness then in its deepest significance and its widest possible reading, and combining its various suggestions as to the nature of the ultimately real, drawn from these various sources in science, art, ethics and religion, absolute idealism interprets reality in terms of Absolute Mind. This Absolute Mind is at once the source and the completion of those spiritual values which operate within our minds in the building up of culture. In our minds their realiza-

tion is relative and incomplete. In the Absolute Mind they find their perfection.

It follows, then, that in any given stage of existence the nature of the reality therein contained is not completely revealed. That stage of existence is not, however, on that account unreal. It is real only in a lower degree or in a manner more or less shallow.

This doctrine of degrees of reality is closely related to the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form. Aristotle conceived that these two never exist separately, but each seeks the other. Though separable in thought they are not separable in fact. The child holds the relation to the full grown man, of matter to form. The latter is the goal of the potential development of the child. Thus a given object may be "form" for one group of beings, "matter" for another. The oak is "form" for the acorn, the potential tree. It is "matter" for the lumber which may be gotten out of it, and this, in turn, becomes "matter" for the table or chair into which it is made. The vegetable upon our table is "form" in relation to the materials which entered into its composition. It is matter with reference to our physical body.

This doctrine of degrees of reality thus propounded originally in Aristotle's theory of development has been maintained by Hegel, and by every other writer who has consistently held his point of view. It is essential to a monistic view of the world. From this standpoint no stage of existence short of the absolute is final or complete. All are relative and incomplete, some more, others less. The inorganic stage of existence is not unreal, it is simply real in a lower degree than the organic. The animal life discloses a fuller degree of reality than the vegetable. Similarly Reality is more completely expressed in man than in the orders of animal life, and in society and the state or nation still more completely than in the individual man. All of these are, from the idealistic viewpoint, mere appearances in which the ultimately real is revealed. According to this doctrine, therefore, it may be readily recognized that nature, interpreted at the level common to naturalistic science is interpreted correctly so far as natural science properly goes. The difficulty arises when it is assumed that nature so interpreted is adequately understood. The idealist maintains that the interpretation

of nature common to naturalistic science overlooks its deeper meaning. The degree of reality therein revealed is too superficial to be regarded as final.

B

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

I. The import of the conception. The Positivist conception of subjective immortality. The pantheistic conception of submergence of the individual in the Absolute. Metempsychosis or transmigration of souls. Import of the conception in its popular form. Permanent self-identity of the individual human life; in a genuine sense the continuation of the life of the present. Death an event in life, not the end of life. The life beyond the fulfillment of the present life.

II. The resources of absolute idealism, for the affirmative treatment of the conception of immortality: less emphasis upon the time-space element than the popular view; the affirmation of an eternal, spiritual factor in the conscious life of man; its positing of spiritual things as absolute and final; its historical spirit; its doctrine of the reality of the ideal.

III. The traits of absolute idealism which make for a negative or obscuring treatment of the conception: the domination of the universal over the finite individual; the denial of the finality of time.

IV. Desirability of a more harmonious adjustment of these seemingly adverse motives within absolute idealism.

I. *The Import of The Conception.*

The term immortality has been accepted in several widely different senses.

1. Least satisfactory of these is that sense in which Auguste Comte and his followers of the Positivist creed spoke of "the subjective life." Of the cry of Danton upon the scaffold, "Perish my memory, only let my country be free", Comte remarks: "Even in this heroic cry we trace the idea that the outward reward of a great life extends to its subjective immortality. He who truly lived for others should hope to live on, in and by others. This subjective return is purer at once and surer than the objective, for it carries on the services rendered and perfects the judgment of those services. Under the impulse given by the Positivist spirit, spontaneously and systematically this noble recompense is accessible to all who are capable of understanding it and deserving it."¹ Clothed in the garb of poetic beauty and given an attractiveness which it would not otherwise possess, this conception of immortality speaks eloquently through the famous lines of George Eliot,—

¹System of Positivist Philosophy, vol. 4, chap. 1, p. 45, Congreve, tr., quoted by Weldon.

Oh, may I join the choir invisible,
 Of those immortal dead who live again
 In minds made better by their presence; live
 In pulses stirred to generosity,
 In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
 For miserable aims that end with self,
 In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
 And with their mild persistence urge man's search
 To vaster issues. So to live is heaven.
 To make undying music in the world
 Breathing as beauteous order that controls
 With growing sway the growing life of men,
 * * * * * This is life to come,
 Which martyred men have made more glorious
 For us who strive to follow.

Such an immortality would have little indeed to offer to that vast multitude, who live out their life's day in obscurity, and who, no less than the illustrious and the martyred, are the true nobility of the earth. The immortality offered by the Positivist, and indeed any immortality depending upon the judgment of men, can not but fail to satisfy. How often we judge each other wrongfully if at all!

2. Immortality is sometimes spoken of in a sense which is not individual or in which individuality is submerged, that is, the individuality of the finite self is lost in the Infinite. This view of the soul, although held by some among modern thinkers, is not modern but ancient. It had its representatives among the Greek and Roman philosophers and poets. There is almost a modern flavor in the sentiment of Euripides, "The mind of the dead is not alive, yet hath it immortal consciousness, when it hath been merged in the immortal ether."¹ Similarly Virgil spoke of the deity who pervades all things, from whom flocks and herds and men and the wild beasts draw the vital air and into whom at last they all return. The doctrine of the Universal Soul among the ancient Greeks and Romans found its chief representatives among the Stoics. It has had a few adherents also among modern philosophers. Even among theologians it claimed no less an adherent than Schleiermacher who

¹Helena, 10, 14.

sought to console a friend of his early youth upon the untimely death of her husband with thoughts better adjusted to this philosophic creed than to the Christian faith. This doctrine fails equally with the foregoing to meet the requirements of human thought and desire, for what is longed for is not submergence in the Absolute, but personal identity in the life to come.

3. It remains simply to notice that conception of immortality, known as metempsychosis or transmigration of souls. This view has had its stronghold in India among both Brahmans and Buddhists. It has had some acceptance also among other widely scattered peoples, mainly of a primitive stage of civilization. It has been ascribed to Pythagoras among the Greeks, and according to Herodotus was borrowed from the Egyptians. Among modern philosophers it was held by Fichte. While it conserves in a measure the individual human life, yet in effect it deprives life of its unique dignity. The soul after death is in no closer or more vital relation to its Creator than before. No ultimate harmony between it and the conditions of its being is provided for. Nor can this belief provide for such a harmony.¹

4. As commonly conceived the doctrine of immortality contemplates a permanent self identity of the individual human life. The course of events may serve to resolve the physical body back into the earthly elements of which it is composed. But over the true self, the soul, it has no power whatever. The return of the body to the earth whence it was taken simply serves to set free the undying spirit which continues to live on. The soul therefore does not share the fate of the body. Nor does it undergo a similar fate, that of being absorbed into one fountain of being where its individuality is lost. The universe may scatter the body, but in all our popular thought the soul remains secure in the possession of its individual being, and "We shall know as we are known".

The life after death is, therefore, regarded as, in a genuine sense, the continuation of the finite life of the present. The interests of the life to come are conceived as genuinely related to the interests of the present. The guiding motive, the deepest desires, all in short that goes to form character, are considered as finding their fulfillment in the after-life, but in such manner

¹Cf. Welldon, *The Hope of Immortality*, Chapter 1, *The Nature of the Belief*.

as to be the unfolding, the ever enlarging development of that which had its beginning in the present order.

This conception of immortality considers death an event in life, not as the end of life. It contemplates, an identity of personal self-consciousness after death with that before.

The life beyond is regarded, therefore, as the satisfaction and complete perfection of the life that is now, in fulness of being of which we can not adequately conceive.

II. *The resources of absolute idealism for the affirmative treatment of the conception of immortality.*

1. It should perhaps be expected that a philosophical discussion of the belief in immortality would place less emphasis upon the *time* element than our popular conception does, and that it would bring into bolder relief the timeless element of the life eternal. We should expect also that it would have little to offer in the way of attempting to image the unseen. However, it is evident that the doctrine of immortality itself is not thus destroyed; for such a discussion seeks merely to lay bare the philosophical foundations of the doctrine. At best the imagery associated with the common conception of the life to come is an effort to present the grandeur of that which transcends present experience from that which is noblest and best in the present order, truer in its purpose no doubt than in its fulfillment.

What, then, are the resources of absolute idealism for an affirmative treatment of this conception?

2. From its doctrine of the universal operative in human thought it is led to affirm a spiritual factor which is eternal. It is this spiritual factor operative in our thinking which so constitutes the norm of thought and reason that its conclusions are accepted as true and valid. It is by no chance or haphazard arrangement that our concepts are formed and group themselves in those general relations that are common to all normal minds. But this power, working in and through the human mind in all ages, inheres in the Over-Mind or Soul.

From its doctrine of the ideality of the human consciousness, likewise, it is led to conclude to the spiritual factor in man. We can not believe that these ideals are present as illusions, since they are inwrought into the fabric of our most secure

sciences. They are present to our minds often as the types and suggestions of things subsequently discovered through their leading. They are spiritual in their nature, not material, and can inhere only in a being who is spiritual.

3. In its insistence upon spiritual things as absolute and final the idealistic philosophy is again found to be in line with the implications of the belief in immortality. For it material things are relative. Their status is wholly secondary. The idea of nature as absolute, a system of rigid law, is not a part of its creed. In consequence this philosophy is in more general sympathy with the historic culture concepts which have gone to promote human progress than with those concepts of the "abstract understanding" whose tendency is to level rather than to build up.

4. In this connection mention should be made of the historical spirit which has always characterized this school of thought. It has constantly manifested a fine appreciation of the positive import of various stages in history and civilization. In this appreciation it has even at times anticipated their subsequent rational grounding and explanation of the stages of history and civilization. The history of philosophy itself, under the treatment of the representatives of this school, came to possess a meaning which is now, indeed, generally accepted but was almost entirely new with it. And while the Hegelian philosophy of history has been found defective in many details it has been fertile in valuable suggestions toward a truer interpretation of the progress of human events than existed previously.

The question may be raised in this connection, to what extent has the aspiration for immortality been one of the essential culture ideals of humanity? That it has been historic is beyond question. It has been and is now well-nigh universal among men of every stage of civilization. It is true the form of the belief has undergone modification, just as other beliefs of men have been modified, and it may be destined to undergo further change. But the belief itself has been among the most persistent ideals of the race and, all things considered, among the most beneficent. Unless then it can be conclusively shown that this belief is the by-product of some psychological motive and its validity thus overthrown, the absolute idealist can not fail

to take account of it as among the essential culture ideals of humanity. But we shall have occasion to return to this subject.

5. It is especially important to observe also that the doctrine of the reality of the ideal inevitably leads the idealist to take account of the aspiration for an eternal life. Without the assurance of a life to come the highest aspirations of our being must remain unsatisfied, life itself incomplete, and our noblest ideals unfulfilled. Everything that is best in us, "bears witness in itself of a power of life and growth far beyond the utmost afforded by the opportunities of earth. These distinctly human qualities do not serve any merely physical purpose. They are not useful in the biological sense. If, therefore, the realization of such powers has a purpose, not fulfilled till put forth to full capacity, we must suppose that human existence is constructed on a scale such that each man can put them forth in their fullness. * * * These ideals are the only things that give value to life. If we have a right to believe anything, we have the strongest moral and intellectual right to believe that these abide forever."¹

Therefore idealism can not be indifferent to this persistent faith of humanity. So long as absolute idealism retains its fundamental principle that the ideal is real and the truly real the ideal, immortality as one of the most persistent of ideals must find a place in its very texture. Otherwise it might as well abandon the task of endeavoring to interpret reality. With the failure of the belief in immortality, idealism itself must fail.

III. *Traits of absolute idealism which make for a negative treatment.*

It must not be overlooked, however, that there are important traits of absolute idealism which make for an obscuring, or even a negative, treatment of immortality.

1. The domination of the Universal over the finite individual is such that the latter may appear virtually to lose his individuality entirely. At least such is the natural conclusion from the statements of eminent representatives of this system of thought. This position seems in fact essential to an idealistic monism. At no stage either of the beginning or development of the in-

¹S. H. Mallone, Present Aspects of the Problem of Immortality, Hibbert Journal, II, 725.

dividual does he appear self-initiated or independent, so completely is he subjected to the universe. It is difficult to see how, as thus expressed, any type of eternal life or absoluteness can be assigned to the finite individual at all. Hegel, himself, points out the dialectical negativity by which every finite *some-what* is dissolved into *being-for-another*, and, while this independent being is finally restored it is restored only in the Absolute. The independence of the finite as such is not restored.

To like purpose Haldane remarks: "For there is but one single subject within which all knowledge and all reality fall. With and in that single subject philosophy and faith assure us that we are one."¹ Again he remarks, "Finite mind is this same (ultimate) Mind in imperfect forms of self-comprehension, self-determinations on the part of the absolute mind,—that are but phases of the activity in which it creates and gathers up the full riches of its concrete self-comprehension."²

In similar vein A. E. Taylor discusses *The Place of The Self in Reality* and comes to the conclusion: "In short, unless you are to be content with a beggarly modicum of continuity of purpose too meager to be more than an empty name, you seem forced to conclude that the origination and again the disappearance of selves in the course of psychical events is a fact of constant occurrence. * * * * * We seem driven, then, to conclude that the permanent identity of the self is a matter of degree, and that we are not entitled to assert that the self corresponding to a single organism need be either single or permanent. It is possible for me, even in the period between birth and death, to lose my old self and acquire a new one, and even to have more selves than one, and those of different degrees of structure, at the same time. Nor can we assign any certain criterion by which to decide in all cases whether the self has been one and identical through a series of psychical events. Beyond the general assertion that the more completely occupied our various interests and purposes are the more permanent is our selfhood, we are unable to go."³

What have we here, then, other than that the finite individual is ultimately dissolved into the Universe, while the only thing that stands fast eternally is this same Universe itself,

¹Haldane, *Pathway to Reality*, vol. 2, p. 248.

²Ibid, vol. 2, p. 256.

³Taylor, A. E., *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 353.

or the Absolute? If we accept statements such as these at their face value we seem driven to the conclusion that when absolute idealism speaks of immortality its fine phrases are uttered with reference not to this or that finite individual but with reference to the Universe as a whole. We have asked for bread and received a stone. The difference between this view of the world and of life and that by which the empirical sciences would explain away everything pertaining to the proper individuality of man is not material so far as the net result to man's true individuality is concerned. In both alike the universe appears to give and take away the life and soul of man. His individual being appears as the wave of the sea that rears its crest for a little while, presently to subside into the great ocean whence it came.

2. Another feature of absolute idealism that appears essential to it and yet obscures, even if it does not deny, the conception of immortality is its denial of time as final in the universe. For the idealist, since Kant at least, time is the *a priori* condition of our sense-perceptions. It is not independent of the human self or of the mind, but is mind-given. Time is in some sense the product of mind. Hence the mind is greater and exists above and beyond time relations. To get at the truth about such a matter as eternal life, it is maintained by Haldane among others, we must resort to conceptions of a higher order than that of time and only then are we delivered from the dilemma that this life either ends with the grave or continues beyond it. Hegel points out that it is an endless, eternal quality of the soul to be a citizen in the kingdom of God. This, he holds, is a quality and a life which is beyond time and that which is transitory.

"Diesz ist eine Bestimmung und ein Leben, das der zeit und Vergänglichkeit entrückt ist, und indem es dieser beschränkten Sphäre zugleich entgegen ist so bestimmt sich diese ewige Bestimmung zugleich als eine Zukunft. Die unendliche Forderung, Gott zu schauen, d. h. im Geiste seiner Wahrheit als einer gegenwärtigen bewusst zu werden, ist für das Bewusstsein als das vorstellende in dieser zeitlichen Gegenwart noch nicht befriedigt."¹

¹Hegel Werke XII, p. 313.

The eternal life must be regarded as in some sense the timeless completion of our historic life. One can readily see, however, how the emphasis upon the character of life as timeless or independent of time tends to identify it with the Eternal, as is the case for example with Spinoza. It may be questioned, however, whether emphasis upon the timeless aspect of human life necessarily identifies it with the Eternal and Absolute. It does indeed lead to a statement of the doctrine of immortality such as is likely to arouse the suspicion that the truly human immortality remaining is, if not a form of words, at least exceedingly obscure. But the idealistic doctrine of the timeless life, as it relates to the immortality of the soul, can scarcely be said to deprive the belief in immortality of its real bearings.

IV. *Desirability of a more harmonious adjustment of these conflicting motives.*

In view of these considerations it is desirable to secure a more harmonious adjustment of these conflicting motives within absolute idealism with reference to their bearing upon a belief so vital to human happiness and wellbeing. It should be possible to give all due recognition to the overlordship of the Universal in relation to our finite life without surrendering our confidence in the reality of spiritual values or our recognition of their historic worth as factors in the development of the truest culture. Upon the success of the effort to establish some such harmony rests the hope of making effective headway against the advance of naturalism at the present time. For that the recent development of the empirical sciences, notably biology and psychology, tends to undermine and overthrow one of the most cherished ideals of mankind is evident to every thoughtful, intelligent person. There is good reason to believe that a careful scrutiny will show that the conclusions of naturalism in this field have been hastily drawn and that the foundations of the ancient faith in the life beyond stand as secure today as ever.

CHAPTER I.

THE IDEALISTIC ANALYSIS OF HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY

A.

SELF DEFINED AS UNITY OF PURPOSE.

I. Aristotle's conception of human individuality and the present day use of it.

II. Modern Idealism. Its emphasis upon the systematizing element in knowledge and in all facts. Leibniz' doctrine of the mind as a will center. Hegel's development of idealism. Human individuality as defined by contemporary writers: unsatisfactory use of terms self, person, individual; the human self an ideal; how one self is distinguished from other selves; society as an individual; enlargement of self, of child, parent, man of business, citizen; society as one inclusive individual; the human race as an individual, organic relation of persons and families through heredity, growth of world consciousness; resumé, the Absolute as the complete individual.

Since a proper discussion of immortality necessarily turns upon the conception of individuality entertained, it is in order to consider at some length the idealistic analysis of the individual and some of the difficulties which this analysis encounters. This conception of the individual early defined itself in terms of purpose.

I. *Aristotle's conception of individuality.*

First among philosophers to give anything like an adequate discussion of individuality was Aristotle. For him the primary basis of all reality is substance, *οὐσία*. All other determinations assume this one as fundamental. Substantiality is to be found, not in the matter of things, but in their form or essence. This form or essence is unlike the matter which underlies the existing thing in that it is determinate. The essence alone expresses the specific nature of the thing from which it can not be separated. The reality is constituted by this conceptual or ideal essence. Neither form nor matter, however, exist *per se*. They exist as formed matter in the concrete individual.

It is important in Aristotle's thought to distinguish between what things are actually, *ἐνεργεῖα* and what they are potentially *δυναμει*. The potential is the persistent tendency toward the actual, not, however, to an indefinite actual, but

to its own actualized being. The acorn is the possibility of the oak, not of some other tree. The child is the potential man. But oak and man exist also ideally, and this ideal existence is prior to the potential in time and in substance. This ideal is also the "end" to be realized by the potential. It is the active principle guiding, as it were, the process of realization. And nothing is to be considered potential which can not realize its "end".

The soul is this realization or entelechy of the body. It is its full development, its earlier perfect realization. It occupies the relation to body which "form" holds to "matter" in Aristotle's thought. As the first entelechy of the body it possesses life potentially.

Applying this principle to the popular conception of the soul Aristotle regarded the soul as the seat of personality, and as having an existence capable of being separated from the bodily life. However, at this point, involving as it does the persistence of personality after death and the immortality of the soul, he is somewhat obscure.

Aristotle's doctrine of the soul exerted a profound influence upon all succeeding thought. It can hardly be considered a spent force even now. His method of viewing the soul was neither introspective exclusively nor empirical alone. He combined the two. He recognized, to a degree which his predecessors did not, the relation of body and soul as a subject which the psychologist dare not leave unnoticed. That the greater part of our mental states have a direct relation to the condition of the bodily organs was quite evident to him. However, he was at complete variance with the materialistic psychology of the Atomists, and with all attempts to assign physical attributes to the soul. For him, it is only through the soul that it is possible to comprehend or explain the body. It is to be noticed that the procedure of modern psychology is just the reverse. The soul is to be understood through a careful study of the physical states. In consequence the psychology of Aristotle is inadequate to meet the problems raised by modern psychology. In its wider relations the Aristotelian doctrine of the vegetative and sensitive soul fails also to satisfy the requirements of the present-day biology. A restatement is therefore needed which, while giving full recognition to the established

results of modern science, will retain the elements of permanent value in Aristotle's discussion of the soul, namely its teleology and its confidence in the reality of the ideal.

II. *Modern idealism.*

1. It is this task which modern idealism has undertaken in opposition to the categories of modern science which attempt to explain all things in terms of mechanism. Modern idealism is throughout teleological, no less than that of Aristotle. It regards all individuality as being expressive of purpose. The degree of reality which is expressed in any given individual is the degree to which the underlying thought is adequately expressed, or rather, perhaps, the degree in which it reveals the organizing universal as Mind. For it holds no less confidently than did Aristotle to the belief that the ideal alone has permanent reality. It is the ideal, or thought, in things which constitutes them real.

Modern idealism lays great emphasis upon the systematizing element in all facts. These facts are not isolated. They have no independent existence, but are closely interrelated in one pervading unity. That unity likewise determines our knowing processes. It is through it, indeed, that our knowledge comes to be organized and systematized. The thoroughgoing character of this systematizing element in knowledge and in all phenomena betrays at once the indebtedness of modern idealism to Aristotle and its point of departure from him.

2. The first among modern philosophers to apply, in the true Aristotelian spirit, the category of purpose to the new knowledge being brought forward in the modern age was Leibniz. He rejected the doctrine of substance and matter advanced by Descartes and further developed by Spinoza. For the definition of matter as extended substance he substituted the conception that its power of resistance is the essential quality of matter. He also regarded matter as essentially immaterial. What we call matter is for him an accumulation of centers of force, the activity of which is, in the last analysis, spiritual. These centers of force are termed monads. From the lowest of these monads up to the highest there is a continuous series. The life of each is a life of perceptual activity. It is a life of thought, but of thought capable of being vastly confused. This confused

thought characterizes the material monads. Souls, on the contrary, are monads in which there is at least partial self-consciousness. But even in man a part of this soul life is obscure. On account of this confusion the world appears to us as a material rather than an immaterial world. In reality it is immaterial, and the only difference between souls and other monads is one of degree. Under this conception whatever development occurs is brought about by the unfolding nature of the monads themselves, not through any mechanical interaction among them. They are in fact without the means of such interaction. Each is sufficient to itself. The relation of whole and part Leibniz does not conceive as one of greater and less but he conceives that the part contains in itself the whole in such wise that, from within the part, the whole might be entirely unfolded. The part must therefore have within itself a certain spontaneity, which manifests itself through perception and appetite. In so far as it is symbolic of the whole, and is capable of producing the whole, it has perception. In so far as it tends actually to realize itself as the whole it has appetite. Thus the process of change is simply the unfolding of the nature of the several monads.

That the unity of the world may not be completely set aside these monads are held together in their mutual relations by the law of pre-established harmony.

3. In Hegel we trace the conception of individuality in terms of purpose no less clearly than in Leibniz, although with a somewhat different emphasis. Hegel's thought is more rigorously and consistently monistic than that of Leibniz. Indeed in this respect he comes nearer to the position of the great opponent of the latter in the field of philosophy, namely Spinoza. Yet his system is by no means to be identified with that of the latter. For Hegel the element of thought is paramount in all things. It is this which constitutes them real. The degree of reality which any given thing reveals is precisely that degree to which the Supreme Thought is adequately expressed. Dialectic is not only involved in the human thought and speech, but is involved in all existence. The conception of any given thing suggests at the same time that which is its opposite, which negates it. But this opposition is overcome in a higher mode of being. Thought, therefore, in the Hegelian system holds

much the same place which force or will holds in that of Leibniz. The various individual objects exist in and for the Absolute and are maintained by it to serve various determinate purposes. The human individual, likewise, holds this same relation in the Absolute life. Man's thought is at the same time the thought of the Over-Mind, his will that in which the will of God finds expression. His life is the unique expression of a purpose, the progressive attainment of an ideal. But that purpose has its origin and completion within the Absolute. In the system of Hegel, consequently, the ideal and the real can not be set off in opposition to each other. The ideal is necessarily real. This principle is axiomatic in his system.

4. *Human individuality as presented by contemporary writers.*

a. In endeavoring to formulate the present thought of idealism in regard to human individuality one is impressed with the limitations of language to express adequately the ideas which it is sought to convey. What meaning shall be attached to such terms as self, person, individual? It is scarcely possible to use any of these in a single sense, or to avoid using them interchangeably. A. E. Taylor, in his *Elements of Metaphysics*, goes perhaps farther than any other contemporary writer toward a well-defined usage of these several terms, but his usage is by no means free from objection since it places too narrow a meaning upon the term self, on the one hand, and, on the other, so restricts his usage of the term person as to deny personality for the Absolute altogether. When the terms self, person, individual, stand alone in this discussion they are to be understood as employed in the common usage, having reference to the finite individual person, unless the connection requires another shade of meaning. Ordinarily when the idea to be presented is that of the social self, or of society as an individual, or of the Absolute as an individual, the appropriate descriptive adjective will be used. The full meaning of these several terms will appear in the course of the discussion. For the present the general definition of individuality by Prof. Fite will serve our purpose: "The individual, in the idealistic sense, is the organized expression of special functions and capacities."¹

b. The idealist, as we have already noticed, defines individu-

¹Fite, Warner, *Introductory Study of Ethics*, p. 219.

ality in terms of purpose. This purpose is germinally expressed even in the infant life. Fite, for example, points out that from earliest childhood the new life has been the expression of purpose even though at that early stage the particular purpose is not yet evident. Notwithstanding, before the child has come to full consciousness, that purpose has already begun unfolding its characteristic life. It makes little difference if subsequently, after choosing a life aim and working toward it for a time, the person comes to feel himself obliged to abandon that aim for another more congenial to his taste, or better adapted to his ability. This very change points to the deeper teleology thus working out a purpose or end more congenial to his nature. The mature choice is the self's truest expression.

Consciousness is therefore essential to the fullest expression of individuality. When we are most fully conscious we are most ourselves. This principle of self-consciousness is at the same time the principle of self-identity. True personality can not, therefore, be stated or explained in terms of mechanism. Consciousness is an entirely different principle. The distinction between them is fundamental.

The conscious individual is also a rational individual. Conscious reason determines his activities toward an end which is also self-chosen. He seeks to attain definite ideals.

It is at this point that the distinction between personalities enters. We are distinguished from each other because our life aims are different. When, however, it comes to defining more closely what constitutes a life aim or purpose we can not avoid expressing our thought through some one or more universal qualities. It begins, then, to appear a question whether it be truer to say we have ideals or ideals have us.

Our life-purpose is not immediate to consciousness especially in youth. Neither is it fully realized at any given moment. Self-consciousness is progressive. Likewise our ideals grow and expand. Death interrupts the process, or at least appears to do so, but who will say that the possibilities of growth have then reached their limit?

c. It is not long before the self-consciousness of the child, which has to do mainly with bodily need, is surpassed. The interests of youth broaden. The man of mature years is personally concerned about a variety of things beyond his immediate self,

family, business, state. Social sympathy leads to an ever increasing interest in the welfare of others. We come to speak of the social whole, of the social body, of organized society, and the like. This line of thought leads many idealists further to declare that one whose capacities had found full expression, an individual person whose powers were harmoniously developed would be identical with the mind of society itself. This degree of common interests on the part of two or more persons would render them "absolutely harmonious and identical."¹

The conception is thus reached that in reality there are not many individuals, that there is in fact but one. The personal will becomes subservient to social ends. Each one, in so far as he has come to his best estate, has become conscious that his personal interests are those of the social whole. The welfare of society has become his primary concern. Just as the artist or the scientist places everything secondary to his art or to his science, so it is when the social motive has become supreme.

The absolute idealist goes even further than this in pointing out the essential oneness of society. He comes to the denial that even our bodily selves are, after all as separate and independent as they appear.² A real independence would require that they be thoroughly self-sustaining, as well as self-moved. But this state is never quite realized. Each is dependent upon a wide range of social activities, the child upon the mother from whom it has drawn its life and derives its sustenance, the wife upon the husband, and each individual upon the interaction of social forces related to every other individual. What a variety of relations is brought to bear for example, in the furnishing of our food supply! The choice viands upon our table have become ours through the working of a vast system of related activities on the part of many men. That we might enjoy the dinner thus served the farmer or stockman has carefully tended his cattle. These have not only grazed upon the pasture but have been fed from the corn supply which was planted, cultivated, gathered, and shelled by means of a variety of implements that engaged the best thought of many minds to contrive, and the best skill of others to manufacture. The cattle thus

¹Fite, *Introductory Study of Ethics*, p. 214.

²For a fuller discussion of the social individual compare Fite's *Introductory Study of Ethics*. pp. 213-217, 220-224.

raised have been sold to the stock-dealer, they have been transported by means of a complex railway system to the packing house, they have been slaughtered and prepared for market by an organized force of workmen which in itself is almost a perfect machine. Thus prepared the product has been transported to the local dealer and there retailed to the consumer. But before you can enjoy your dinner it must be further prepared by the housewife or maid, with the aid of fuel which organized labor and capital have combined to transfer from beneath the earth to your home and fireside. Complete isolation is impossible.

d. This interdependence of man upon man and upon the whole of society carried out still farther along the line of heredity discloses the fundamental unity of the human race. The individual is physically related to his parents, each of these in turn to other parents and so on. Tribes exist which have for the most part grown from single families. These tribes related by blood among their individual members, are similarly related to other tribes. Interesting illustrations of this tribal relation, growing out of earlier family ties, are easily traced among the Hebrews and surrounding peoples of antiquity. So in a still larger sense nation is related to nation. From Great Britain on the West to India on the East may be traced one common original stock, the Aryan or Indo-European.

Following this principle still further we acquire a complete view of the organic oneness of the human family.

A similar view or conclusion in regard to the race as an ideal individual may be reached if we take into consideration recent and pending international movements. Such expressions as "class consciousness", and "national consciousness" have long had a tolerably clear and fixed meaning. Are we not developing at the present time something in the nature of a world consciousness? The international congresses convoked among the Christian nations for various purposes during the past century, culminating in the Peace Conferences at the Hague and the machinery devised by them for the adjustment of international differences which threaten war, the numerous international arbitration treaties and many other movements less conspicuous, point to the growth of a world consciousness containing immense possibilities for the future of mankind. It is an ideal that in-

spires these international movements toward a "federation of the world", one possessing many indications that it is already in process of fulfillment.

e. To sum up this discussion of individuality, it has been observed that the distinction of individuals is not meaningless nor to be ignored. What the idealist denies is that they are separate and mutually independent. The individual is regarded as "an organized expression of special functions and capacities" which are potentially those of the human race itself. Not all nor indeed many of these capacities become developed in any single individual. The vast majority of them remain latent. Special functions do, however, come to a tolerably full development. How or why the individual came to express the particular functions which have become characteristic of him the idealist does not attempt to explain beyond the suggestion that the inner life of humanity may somehow exert a determining influence of this character in order that special needs as they arise in the unfolding life of humanity may thus be supplied. Who can tell whether, through the removal of present restraints, these suppressed, unrealized purposes which remain latent in the individual's present life may not attain to a development commensurate with the complete life of humanity? Specialization, it is pointed out,¹ far from being inconsistent with common interests is in fact the most effective means by which these fundamental interests gain realization. Individuality, moreover, is marked by the organization of the interests to be subserved, and the degree of that organization determines the degree of individuality.

From the standpoint of humanity the absolute idealist declares that the one complete individual is the social individual, attaining its full expression in racial unity. This is considered by Fite and others the one complete organism and the only perfect personality. Relative to this whole of humanity, the finite individual is a mere abstraction. As we know him his whole nature is but partially expressed.

But the human standpoint is not the final point of view. Above and beyond the human individual, viewed at any level we may choose, there remains a more inclusive, a more perfect

¹Fite, *Introductory Study of Ethics*, p. 219.

and complete individual, in whom all others have their being, the Absolute. All things have their source and goal in Him.

f. The discussion of the idealistic analysis of the human individual culminates, then, in the Absolute Being. The measure of reality in finite individuals is the degree in which the Absolute finds expression in them as the differentiations of its fundamental unity. Our human lives present aspects of the divine life. In a more profound sense even than St. Paul had in mind the absolute idealist maintains, "It is God that worketh in you."

The relation which the finite individual sustains to the Absolute is therefore seen to be one of great interest and importance for the deeper issues of our subject.

B

DIFFICULTIES OF THE TELEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF MIND. THE MIND AS RELATIVE.

I. The finite individual and the Absolute. Royce's definition of the individual. The self defined in terms of meaning and purpose of the Absolute. How the element of uniqueness is conceived. The Absolute as a self, all inclusive.

In criticism, the element of uniqueness not sufficiently safeguarded by Royce; the truth that "in God we live and move and have our being" does not necessarily involve identity of thought and will; this full identity endangers ethical distinctions that are fundamental; Royce's failure to provide an adequate ground in the individual for the will and purpose whose uniqueness is essential to his theory; the individual an existent, greater than his thoughts and purposes or the sum of them, related to the absolute by inclusion not identity; man's will therefore free even to oppose the Eternal, however ineffectually. So also Ormond.

II. The apparent instability of the organic unity of mind. Questions raised by facts of multiple personality or dissociation; study of these comparatively recent, hence conclusions for the most part tentative; lines of dissociation mainly follow tastes and moods; dissociated states capable of being resolved back into primary states; possible extent of dissociation; the range of the subconscious life far greater than usually supposed; the development of secondary selves tends to confirm the idealistic definition of the individual; the personal "I" an index of personality, voicing the predominant state; causes of dissociation and its general effects. May it be that, with removal of physical organism, these and all other suppressed purposes will come to normal expression?

III. The finite individual and the physical universe. Discussed in the next chapter, the Human Mind and The Natural Order.

That the effort to conceive of mind as a unity of purposes more or less fully expressed, and yet as genuinely one, is not free from certain difficulties, is apparent (1) from the relation

of the human mind to the Absolute, (2) from a consideration of the nature of the mind itself, and (3) from the relation of the human individual to the physical universe.

I. *The finite individual and the Absolute. Royce's definition of the individual.*

1. From the metaphysical side, then, can the individual person, as that term is commonly used, be said in any proper sense to have an existence of his own? Is the human mind purely relative in all its thoughts and emotions, nothing more nor less than the momentary expression of the one great All? This question Prof. Royce seems to answer in the affirmative.

After discussing at some length the empirical self and the self of realism and rejecting both as unsatisfactory statements of the true meaning of individuality he thus defines the implications of individuality:¹ "Primarily, then, the contrast of Self and not-Self comes to us as the contrast between the Internal and External meaning of this present moment's purpose. In the narrowest sense the Self is just your own present imperfectly expressed pulsation of meaning and purpose,—this striving, this love, this hate, this hope, this fear, this inquiry, this inner speech of the instant's will, this thought, this deed, this desire,—in brief this idea taken as an Internal meaning. In the widest sense, the not-Self is all the rest of the divine whole of conscious life,—the Other, the outer World of expressed meaning taken as in contrast with what, just at this instant of our human form of consciousness, is observed, and relatively speaking, possessed." The mental states and attitudes, capable of a certain amount of selfhood have, or ought to have, some one principle whereby they would possess a united and permanent meaning. This uniting purpose or principle would identify "the part of the world's life which is to be in the larger sense one's own." This feeling that one ought to be able to select from the universe a certain portion of purposeful life as that of his true individual self, such that he would contrast with this whole of his individual life, all other individual selves and the Absolute, reveals the self as an ethical category. One's whole meaning is and will remain one with the whole life of God. At the same time this whole mean-

¹Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. II, p. 272.

ing is conceived by Royce as finding expression in the form of contrasting and cooperating lives, of which the one, for example, which is mine is "linked more closely in purpose, task and meaning with the life of this instant than is the life of any other individual. * * * * By this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal, by this intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned union with them,—by this and not by the possession of any soul-substance I am defined and created a self."¹

2. The self then has no absolutely independent being. But in distinction from Kant's definition of self as merely a valid law Royce defines it as a life. Its individuality is gained through its relation to God. Yet in Him it nevertheless dwells as an individual. It is an unique expression of the divine purpose. At the same time it is to be insisted upon that in the present form of human consciousness, the true Self of any individual man is an ideal rather than a datum. All individual lives, plans and experiences find their unity in God. They do so, however, in such a manner that there is but one ultimate and integrated Self, that of the Absolute. Our individuality as distinct from other individualities is retained merely in so far as our life-plans are mutually contrasting life-plans, each one reaching its completion only as it recognizes its own difference from other life-plans. The self, then, is never found as a completely realized fact. It is an ideal, having its true place in the eternal world where all plans have their fulfillment.

The degree of uniqueness attaching to each individual life is further emphasized by Royce in maintaining that the dependence of the self means simply that it derives from the other lives everything it possesses except its uniqueness,—“everything except its individual fashion of acknowledging and taking interest in its very dependence, and of responding thereto by its deeds. In taking your place among men you must derive all of your life from elsewhere except in so far as your life becomes for you your own way of viewing your relation to the whole, and of actively expressing your own ideal regarding this relation. This your own way of expressing God's will is not derived. It is yourself. And it is yours because God worketh in you.”²

¹Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. II, p. 226.

²*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 293.

This purpose of yours is entirely your own, therefore, and can be shared by no other. It is underived, because directly produced in you by the God whose will you thus uniquely express in the totality of your life-plan.

3. Royce conceives of the Absolute as a Self, in its form "inclusive of an infinity of various, but interwoven, and so of intercommunicating selves, each one of which represents the totality of the Absolute in its own way and with its own unity, so that the simplest conceivable structure of the Absolute Life would be statable only in terms of an infinitely great variety of types of purpose and of fulfillment, intertwined in the most complex fashion."¹ Accordingly he holds that all ignorance, striving, defeat, error, narrowness, and so on, that are seen in us are present from the Absolute point of view, and seen in unity with the overcoming of all defeats, ignorance, error, narrowness and the like. If it be asked, then, how we have become sundered from the Absolute and our consciousness narrowed, it is replied, that "such narrowness must find its place within the Absolute life in order that the Absolute should be complete. From the point of view of the Absolute, the finite beings never fall away,"² The inseparable aspect of a man's nature, incapable of causal explanation, is that which finds expression in his resolve to be, in God's world, himself and no one else. But in this will to be a unique individual, God also wills and His will or act, whereby your individuality becomes what it is in purpose and meaning, is identical with your own individual will. Except as thus identical it does not exist.³

Royce therefore concludes his discussion of the Place of the Self in Being by laying down what he takes to be the deepest truth that religion has been seeking to teach humanity, namely that "God can not be One except by being many, nor can the various selves be many without being one in Him."⁴

4a. In criticism of Royce's discussion of the finite individual the Absolute it is to be urged that the individual is so completely relative to the Absolute and is so dominated by the Absolute that the element of uniqueness is largely lost to view and the individual, in comparison, is nothing but a phase, an aspect of

¹Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. II, p. 298.

²*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 302.

³*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 327.

⁴*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 331.

the Over-Mind. It is true, indeed, that the self is defined as an ideal to be chosen and incorporated in the life-plan of the individual, and that the Absolute is defined as a complex interrelation of selves, each of which has a certain measure of uniqueness, types of purpose and of fulfillment, intertwined in the most complex fashion. But what is thus granted appears to be again withdrawn when it is maintained that "the divine act whereby God wills your individuality * * * * * is identical with your own individual will, and exists not except as thus identical."¹ It is difficult to see how any true individuality can be adequately maintained upon this basis as having any permanent significance.

b. The general statement, which is indeed also fundamental to Royce's discussion, that "in God we live and move and have our being," probably few persons would be disposed to deny. But that this conception involves the degree of identity for which Royce contends is not so clear. We may recognize that the ideals which find expression in our lives exist by virtue of the divine nature and the divine will, we may admit that the modes of their combination and the general behavior of our minds, as of all other things, find their possibility in the creative activity of God and that the power which brought these into being constantly upholds them, without finding in these the complete expression of the divine life, or that measure of identity by which every human thought and act are at the same time God's thought and God's act. The family may be taken in a general sense as a unit in which the will of its head is expressed. But should the father therefore be considered identical with the child, or the child's thought, purpose and act at the same time the father's?

c. The degree of identity between the human individual and the Absolute individual upon which Royce lays so much emphasis, and indeed any identification of this kind, has a tendency to confuse ethical distinctions. If my thought and my act may properly be considered at the same time God's thought and act, so that God's will is thus identical with my will, "and exists not except as thus identical," my thought, purpose and act, no matter what their ethical character, are His. God thus

¹The World and the Individual, vol. II, p. 327.

comes to have the same moral character that man has, and the holiness of God to be a conception largely devoid of true meaning. Logically it would appear also that man must be exonerated from moral guilt, if he be identical with God. These are deductions which Royce probably would repudiate or from which he would seek to vindicate his scheme of thought. And it may be that the doctrine of degrees of reality is susceptible of an interpretation which would go far toward breaking the force of these criticisms. Nevertheless the fuller development of Royce's doctrine has not safeguarded it from a criticism of this character.

One might question also whether it is a true and adequate expression of "the deepest truth which religion has been seeking to teach humanity," to say with Royce, this truth is that God cannot be One except by being many, nor can the various selves be many without being one in Him."¹

d. Royce's presentation of the meaning of individuality fails to satisfy when he represents the self as "this possession of an ideal, this intent always to remain another than my fellows despite my divinely planned union with them," and when he says further, "by this and not by the possession of any soul-substance I am identified and created a self."² One inevitably thinks of an existent, call it soul-substance or what you may, in which this purpose inheres, in which the will to assert a certain uniqueness finds root. Denying this there is no recourse but to make the self completely one with the Absolute, so completely, in fact that "the divine will exists not except as thus identical" with my individual will. Let it be assumed that the individual is not merely the special purpose of the Absolute, but a being brought into existence by the special purpose of the Absolute and endowed with thought, feeling and will truly his own and not identical with that of some other, yet preserved and upheld by the thought and purpose of the Omnipotent, and all that has here been said of the determination in God's world to express "my own freely-chosen life-plan" becomes more capable of being consistently thought and defended. Lacking this we have a thorough-going monism indeed but not true individuality.

¹Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. II, p. 331.

²*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 226.

I have been much pleased to find that this general criticism of Royce is that also of Prof. A. T. Ormond as expressed in his recent book on Concepts of Philosophy. With regard to the relation of the conscious individual to the eternal consciousness, Ormond holds that the individual existence is grounded by the specialized thought and purpose of the divine. This concentrated meaning, he maintains, liberates the energy of of which I am conscious as *my* energy. "In short," he declares, "the divine energy is *institutive* and grounds the center of existence and conscious energy which I call myself. If it be asked whether the divine thought-purpose that institutes me is identical with the thoughts and purposes which I form and under which my agency is exercised, I am forced to deny this identity because the divine idea-purpose institutes *me*, the existent, and I am conscious of being more than the *sum of my thoughts and purposes*. There is a permanent background or inroot of these thoughts and purposes, which is also included in my existence and it is an *existent* that is thus instituted."¹

These existents, he holds, are related to each other by interpenetration, not by identity. A certain measure of self-assertiveness lies at the center of the existent, by which the individual is kept in being by exclusion of other individuals. Interpenetration is accomplished by means of *representation* and *sympathy*, the instruments for which are *imitation* and *suggestion*. "The great lesson we need to learn here," observes Ormond further, "is that we may enter into the life of our fellow and influence it to any extent, without ever becoming identical with him or actually thinking his thoughts or feeling his emotions. The category of interpenetration is not *identity* but *community*."²

e. The individual is, then, not merely a specialized purpose of the Absolute but the *existent* intended by this specialized purpose. The relation to the eternal is that of an instituted individual capable of thoughts and purposes of its own. The divine idea-purposes, Ormond teaches, are related to the finite idea-purposes by inclusion, not by identity. There are, then, two purposes, not one, and being coexistent they are liable to collide. One of these however is certain to triumph.

¹Ormond, A. T., Concepts of Philosophy, p. 522.

²Ibid, p. 524.

f. In relation to the eternal the individual is thus seen to be a free cause. He has the power of moral choice and this power of choice rests on the prior assent to the ethical demand or law as obligatory. One can, if he will, choose to disregard his duty, thus violating the ethical law. All this is within the province of the individual. Accordingly he is a true cause and brings results into the world which may even be in opposition to the will of the Eternal.¹

II. *The apparent instability of the organic unity of the mind.*

1. A further difficulty in the way of conceiving of the mind as an organized system of purposes at various stages of realization, yet as genuinely and organically one, arises from a group of facts of great interest, but imperfectly understood. They are connected with the study of multiple personality or dissociation, a field of investigation in mental phenomena that is receiving more attention at the present time than ever before.² From the imperfect state of investigation into these phenomena it seems fair to conclude that it is too early to claim finality for any interpretation of them that has yet been advanced.

2. The facts here referred to are those connected with what is commonly termed dual or multiple personality, in which two or more "selves" are developed, each having widely different characteristics but little or no common memory. In most cases so far studied, they appear as successive states, in a few instances as coexistent and alternating selves, each having well marked characteristics of its own. The closer investigation of these cases goes to show that they are dissociated states of the primary self, and ultimately resolvable into that primary and more normal person. Hence the general title, dissociation, is more accurate than dual or multiple personality. However, they raise a number of interesting questions concerning the nature of individuality and its true stability.

3. Dissociation follows along the lines of taste, or mood.

¹Ormond, A. T., *Concepts of Philosophy*, p. 529.

²The literature of this subject, on this account, is somewhat meager. Several well authenticated cases of dual or multiple personality are cited by James in his *Elements of Psychology*, vol. I, Chap. X. Among other interesting studies of this character may be mentioned Binet's *Alterations of Personality*; Sidis and Goodhart's *Multiple Personality*; Jastrow's *The Subconscious*; Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*. The last named forms the descriptive part of a larger work *Problems in Abnormal Psychology*. It is a highly interesting study of a very complicated case of dissociation, and is to be followed by a volume dealing with the theory of this case and with kindred phenomena in the field of abnormal psychology.

So far as the study of these cases has gone, it has apparently not been found to occur along moral lines to any marked degree, so that the case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde still exists solely in fiction. An altered personality may be nothing more than the exaggeration of a mood of the dominant temper. Jastrow¹ likens these defections to the sprouts of budding personalities, which, if grafted upon a suitable stem may under favorable circumstances, send forth distinctive flower and fruit. There is this difference, however, that an altered personality may become an alternate personality, or, carrying out the figure, the tree that bore plums today may tomorrow bear prunes or apricots. For the recurrence of secondary personality there must be a recurrent and systematized liability to these lapsed states, so that there comes to be acquired a memory capable of integrating events, and an avenue of assimilation and expression through the new personality gaining control of the sensory and muscular systems. There is also found some participation in the endowments, acquisitions and habits of the original and primary self. In a true sense all personality is acquired. Not merely nature but nurture also enters into the development of the individual. He is the sum total both of what he has inherited and of what he has acquired.

4. The case of Miss Beauchamp, studied by Prince, has furnished ground for the conclusion that the possible extent of dissociation is almost without limit. Such at least is the conclusion reached by Prince himself. In his treatment of the case, extending over a period of eight or nine years, by accident, hypnosis, or other means, no less than five or six "selves" were developed or discovered. No one of these possessed the proper characteristics of a normal person, however, and all were subsequently resolved back into the self from which they had sprung until finally the true primary individual was restored.

5. The study of these various cases of dissociation suggests that the range of our subconscious life is vastly greater than has ordinarily been supposed. In the case of Miss Beauchamp, B III or Sally, who had a strong dislike for her other selves, particularly for "the saint", B II, maintained that her own separate consciousness extended back as far as Miss Beauchamp's early childhood. She appears as the impersonation of "the spirit

¹The Subconscious, pp. 464-529.

that contradicts." At times she is the dominant "self". Then again she is superseded by the more normal B I. In the final restoration she accepts her place in the subconscious life, still liable, however, to reappear when mental strain or great emotion tends to bring about dissociation of the primary self.

6. That the individual is in some sense the organized expression of a system of ideals and purposes in very intimate relation with the body is the natural, and perhaps the only satisfactory conclusion which can be drawn from these and like facts relating to the subconscious life.

It appears likewise that the personal ego, the I of conversation, is an index or function of the personality rather than the whole of the personal life or self. It reflects the dominant state or the passing mood. Accordingly it is found in the service of all the various selves into which the primary self may be resolved.

7. Dissociation has usually been attended with results that are destructive, so long at least as the dissociated state continues. The new self is narrowed in outlook and comparatively helpless except as it is permitted to develop, but it is never, or rarely, a normal self. In a few instances, however, as in the case of Mary Reynolds, studied by Dr. Weir Mitchell, the result of apparent dissociation has been beneficent, indicating an early inhibition afterward removed.

The conclusion to which the study of dissociation of personality tends is, as noted above, that of the idealist, namely that the mind is a unity expressive of ideals and purposes, not all of which come to mature development or dominate the life. Many of these are continually repressed. The facts of dissociation reveal in an impressive manner the complexity of that unity. That physical accidents or great mental strain, or intense emotion may occasion a certain measure of apparent disintegration does not indicate a permanent instability in the unity of the mind, or that it is merely the expression of physical functions. It points rather to the temporary inefficiency of the physical organism to afford it normal expression. Consequently when the effects of accident have been removed, or have been overcome, or when improved health has succeeded to an abnormal physical condition or other causes of dissociation have been removed, the mind comes to its normal expression once more. It may well be, therefore, that after death has

intervened, a development of our personality will occur in which the suppressed possibilities will find their complete fulfillment and this individual come to a perfected realization of all his capacities.

A further difficulty in the way of conceiving the unity and permanent stability of the human mind arise from the physical side and will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

THE HUMAN MIND AND THE NATURAL ORDER.

I. The finite individual and the physical universe. The eternity of mass and energy in contrast with the ephemeral nature of the physical individual. The application of the categories of physical science to human life and development.

II. The apparent dependence of mind upon body. Man's place in nature. The problem grows out of the close and intimate relation of mind and body. Is this dependence final? Need of closer definition of the terms used.

III. The body. The popular view recognizes reality of both mind and body, but is dualistic. The naturalistic view connects the body with organic life in general. Critique of naturalistic view; idealistic elements involved. The idealistic view: an objective expression of mind through which experience arises in perceptive life; exists for and is sustained by the Absolute, possesses a relatively low degree of reality.

IV. The mind. The popular view of mind, the center of personality, intimately connected with the body but never completely so. The naturalistic view of mind, mind as the product of brain function. Criticism of this view. The idealistic view of mind: manifestation of mind in imperfect expression; defined in terms of teleology; in close relation with physical objects which, like mind itself, are maintained by the Absolute.

V. Mutual relations of body and mind. Difficulty of defining satisfactorily. Need of keeping in view that body and mind manifest the Absolute in different degrees of reality. Their relations not necessarily parallel. The true relation is to be found in some form of interactionism. Bradley's conclusions. Nevertheless the mind, being the more complete expression of the mind of the Absolute, is more fundamental than the body and capable of surviving it.

I. *The finite individual and the physical universe.*

1. In the physical world, we are assured, the things that are truly permanent are few. Among the most important of these are mass and energy. It was formerly maintained that the so-called elements are equally stable and enduring, but through the discoveries of Ramsay and Rutherford this position has been considerably modified. It has been ascertained that radium, for example, can change into helium and another substance unknown as yet. The investigations of Rutherford disclosed a whole series of elements having similar characteristics. These facts are recognized as teaching that some elements are decidedly mortal. But not so mass and energy. These at least are held to be eternal. For the physical scientist this means that, just as, under no known circumstances has the amount of mass or the amount of energy changed, so no circumstance will occur in future that will cause such a change. The

scientist recognizes the impossibility of demonstrating an event which may occur in the remote future, but bases his conclusion upon reasonable prediction growing out of past experience.¹

What is equally impressed upon the physical scientist, in addition to the apparent eternity of mass and energy, is the ephemeral nature of the individual. If two different masses are combined the resulting mass is found to behave like the sum of the two single masses. This is simply the consequence of the conservation of mass. But though the two masses retain their quantity, their individuality is lost. Similarly, if two glasses of water be poured into one vessel, the sum of the two is obtained, but their individuality has disappeared. If the glasses be refilled there is no possible means of determining whether the water in each glass is now the same water that was there before. The question of individuality here is without meaning, since there is no means of seeking out the individual particles of water and identifying them. Even if the atoms could be separated it would be impossible to identify them since, by definition, they are all alike in shape, weight, and other properties. The same conclusion is held for energy.

2. This law, generally admitted as applicable to the physical world, the physicist is very apt to regard as applicable also to human development. For him the difficulty in its application arises from insufficient means to measure homogeneity and heterogeneity in human affairs. Ostwald, for example, maintains: "It seems pretty certain that increase of culture tends to diminish the differences between men. It equalizes not only the general standards of living, but attenuates also even the natural differences of sex and age. * * * * * Now if we recall the happiest moments of our lives, they will be found in every case to be connected with a curious loss of personality. In the happiness of love this fact will be at once discovered. And if you are enjoying intensely a work of art, a symphony of Beethoven's for example, you find yourself relieved of the burden of personality and carried away by the stream of music as a drop is carried by a wave. The same feeling comes with the grand impressions nature gives us. Even when I am sitting quietly sketching in the open there comes to me in a happy moment a

¹Compare Ostwald's Ingersoll Lecture, Individuality and Immortality. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, Mass.

sweet feeling of being united with the nature about me, which is completely characterized by complete forgetfulness of my poor self. We may conclude from this that individuality means limitations and unhappiness, or is at least closely connected with them!"¹

3. If this statement from Ostwald appears to go beyond the realm of the physical into the metaphysical, we may turn to the physiologist or to the psychologist who maintains that what we call mind is simply a system of nerve reactions, developed among the ancestors of man during the long ages of the past and so deeply imbedded in the nervous organization that they now occur in this particular manner and in no other. Thought, being functioned by the brain, it follows that what we commonly call mind is merely a series of bodily phenomena and has no separate existence. When the brain has ceased to act, thought for that individual, is forever at an end. There is no permanent self-identity, but man surrenders up "his individual being,

To mix forever with the elements,
To be a brother to the insensible rock,
And to the sluggish clod which the rude swain
Turns with his share and treads upon."

II. *The apparent dependence of the mind on the body.*

1. The problem here presented grows out of the intimate relation between body and mind. At no period of life does the mind appear wholly free from the states of the body. In infancy the mental powers are as rudimentary as the physical. They expand as the body develops. Important physical changes at the critical periods of life are accompanied by corresponding mental changes. Certain mental activities have their seat in corresponding fixed areas of the brain. An undeveloped brain goes with imbecility. Old age is accompanied not only with physical debility but also with loss of mental vigor. Memory fails and the reasoning powers become enfeebled. Bryant is said to have ceased to write poetry after the age of fifty and to have begun the translation of Homer because, in his opinion, old age is not conducive to creative activity.

2. The question very naturally arises, therefore, as to how

¹Ostwald, *Individuality and Immortality* pp. 44-46.

these two series of facts are related to each other. Are the bodily conditions the ultimate cause of the corresponding mental phenomena that attend them? If so then what we term mind appears to have a purely ephemeral existence. When age and decay shall have done their work upon the physical frame and the body shall be dissolved into the elements of which it is composed, the mind likewise, as the effect of its activities, will have perished. Having had no prior existence and no independent being it can have none now. It is in daily peril also, equally with the body, from every chance accident arising from the hostile working of the same nature that built up the body, working now through storm, now through excessive heat or cold, now through the ravages of disease.

3. It is frequently pointed out that to establish a causal relation of this character is beyond the power of the sciences of nature, that, in the field of mental phenomena, or in the borderland between the mental and the physical, natural science can do no more legitimately than to recognize that the two series of phenomena are concomitant, that when an event belonging to one series occurs, a corresponding event belonging to the other occurs with it. And even this is methodological, rather than ontological. To go beyond this is to enter the province of metaphysical speculation. Of course it is not expected that the inquiring mind will pause in its search for ultimate truth at this stage. It will seek something further whether that something be labeled scientific or metaphysical. We are here simply recognizing the limitations of scientific method.

If these changes be concomitant two explanations of them seem possible. They may both be produced from one cause lying further back, which reveals itself on the one hand as physical, on the other as mental,—the doctrine of parallelism. Or they may be regarded as so disparate in their nature as to be measurably independent each of the other, in the sense of not being involved in the other's fate, while each is intimately bound up with the other, acts upon the other, and in turn is acted upon in a vast variety of ways. This doctrine of interactionism has been held in several forms. It is frequently held in a dualistic form as just outlined. It is held also in an idealistic form in that the body is regarded as an objective expression of mind for the purposes of its perceptive life, and that, as such, it exists for

and is maintained by the mind as Absolute. It is in this form that the interactionist theory of the relation of the body to the mind possesses chief interest for us.

However, it has doubtless become evident that, before any satisfactory headway can be made in setting forth the mutual relations of mind and body, or the place of the human mind in the order of nature, a closer definition of both mind and body is needed.

III. *The body.*

1. The popular view of the body makes of it an object separate from the mind. It is the instrument of the latter, not in the sense that the mind is essentially in need of such a means of expressing its activity, but more in the sense that for purposes of the present life amid physical surroundings it is the medium of the mind's self-expression. The body, therefore, is in no proper sense to be identified with the mind. It occupies space, requires a certain amount of food to keep it in health, and a certain amount of activity in order to maintain its vitality in normal condition. The human body is material in its structure, and is subject to the laws which control matter in all its forms. It is in no sense the true person, but is often regarded as something of an encumbrance, so that, when at last death intervenes, the true self is set free.

As little need be said in exposition of the popular view of the body so also the criticism of it may be brief. Its dualism is so transparent as to give it no place in serious philosophical or scientific thought. It recognizes body and mind as separate modes of being and in this respect approaches somewhat the position of the idealist. But while it recognizes a certain mutual relation and interaction between mind and body it gives no adequate explanation whatever of that relation.

2. The naturalistic view of the body has been partly outlined above. It takes fuller notice of the various activities of the body and of the relations which these sustain to what we have commonly regarded as the mind. But the term mind is one with which the naturalistic writer seeks to dispense as of comparatively little service. Or he redefines it in terms of neural adjustments. The body, under this view, is the product of evolution through long ages and a variety of forms of organic

life. In the long process its modes of activity have become clearly defined. A nervous system has been built up, which controls the varied movements of the body by means of a system of reactions the most complex. Governing and directing all as a sort of clearing house for the redirection of motions, the brain rules. It is the central organ which regulates our activities. The type of body thus developed through the ages shows traces of redundant organs. But while it is still capable of a certain degree of further perfection it is securely established in the order of nature.

The naturalistic view marks an advance over the popular view of the body. It recognizes that no dualistic view can be permanently satisfactory. It has a keen appreciation also of the intimate connection between the body and what is commonly termed mind. The difficulty arises when the naturalistic scientist sets out to treat the mind in terms of physical matter alone, to interpret it as an adjective of the body. Naturalism stands for the doctrine that the phase of the world presented at the level of the physical is a final reading of nature. It fails to find any deeper reality and provides no place for a recognition of ideal factors guiding the development of the physical. It is curious and interesting to observe, therefore, how the ideal avenges itself of this neglect particularly in the fuller exposition of the subject now before us, involved in the naturalistic theories of transmission through heredity.

Spencer accounted for the facts of heredity, as well as for the restoration of lost parts of certain animals, by assuming the existence of physiological units in each of which there is an intrinsic aptitude to develop the particular forms of the given species, just as the atoms of a salt crystallize in a particular way. These units, far more complex than molecules permeate the organism. Reproduction is rendered possible through the physiological units contained in the germ. In different species the units are of different kinds. In one body they are of the same kind but differently arranged for producing the various parts under the guiding influence of the whole. It is objected to this explanation of heredity that, while it keeps in view the end to be attained, it fails to point out the means sufficiently and their organic connection with the goal of the process.

Spencer's error was an excess of the idealistic element in an abstract form.

Darwin's theory of pangenesis was free from the strongest objections to Spencer's view of heredity. It teaches that all the cells of the organism throw off minute gemmules which, through mutual affinity, cluster together and under proper conditions reproduce the tissues and organs from which each individual gemmule was originally derived. In criticism of Darwin it is urged that he pointed out the means for the development of the new individual, but the theory of pangenesis does not point out sufficiently the organic relation to the plan of the whole to be carried out through them. The theory furnishes a mechanical basis for accounting for the facts, but the idealistic element is clearly and necessarily presupposed.

Weismann's theory, which is more widely current than either of the foregoing, assumes the existence of a germ plasm which is continuous from parent to offspring and remains unchanged in the latter. This germ plasm is naturally immortal, dying only by accident, whereas the cells forming the body die of their own nature. In Weismann's theory there is a synthesis of the directing totality with the mechanical means organic to that totality. We find at once an idealistic and a mechanical element in synthesis. Whether this synthesis is complete or not the students of the logic of biology must determine.

In all these explanations, attempting as they do to account, upon a mechanical basis, for the development of life, the ideal persistently obtrudes. It is the continuance of the general type that is to be explained. How is it that the creature newly brought into being conforms to the type of the parents, and is not made up of parts confusedly related to each other? It is not, indeed, the old conception of purpose, taught by Paley and his successors, of an external purpose realized by direct creation. It is that of immanent design through mediate creation or development. Nature can not otherwise be understood than through this conception of immanent purpose. Even the inorganic world reveals plan in its arrangement and in the adjustment of part to whole. Without the aid of this conception of purpose the organic world would be even more difficult of explanation than the inorganic. The organism is a unit whose every part subserves the plan of the whole. In the idea of a formative hered-

itary substance mechanism is combined with teleology and finds its significance in it. These units have their "tendency" to form organisms. But "tendency" and "influence," though inhering in the material unit or germ, are not themselves material. In the final analysis they exhibit the thought and will of the Absolute. The laws which they follow in their working are the manifestations of the Divine Mind.

3. Some further definition of the body, is, therefore, needed than that offered by naturalism, one which will give fitting and full expression to the idealistic elements within the naturalistic conception itself. This need the idealist endeavors to supply.

To the absolute idealist the human body, like the entire order of nature, is an outward expression of mind. It has come to its present form through an evolution extending through many ages. But at no stage could it be considered in any sense self-subsistent. It expresses the purposes of mind. The human body is the instrument through which the mind as finite attains outward expression. As all lower forms of organic and inorganic existence have their meaning in the life of the Absolute so also does the body of man. It is the medium through which arise the sense-perceptions in which the human mind discovers order and significance, and which it employs for its various purposes. Its preservation is due to the activity of the Absolute. It is through the Universal Mind and by it that these bodies are successively developed and, when they have served their purpose, are in turn laid aside.

The body, therefore, is the medium for the activity of the Absolute at the same time that it serves the finite mind; for it is by means of the human individual, therefore also of the human body, that the Absolute becomes expressed within human relations in the time-space world.

The degree of reality which belongs to the body is, in consequence, of a relatively low order. It is in no sense a final form of being. Since it exists simply to serve certain ends, these ends once fulfilled the reasons for its existence are satisfied and its individuality is surrendered. In the end, therefore, according to the absolute idealist, the body has no abiding reality.

IV. *The mind.*

1. The view of the mind commonly held regards it as the seat of true personality. It is an entity separate from the body and measurably independent of it. It is the seat of the emotional life, of thought and of will. It is preeminently the person. It is the soul, the immaterial part of man which survives the body at death. Intimately joined to the body it is powerfully influenced by the states of the latter, but it is not wholly subject to these. It possesses within itself the power to defy the physical state when interest impels it to do so, and, upon the destruction of the body, is set free to follow its own characteristic life.

2. The view of the mind taken by the biologist and the physiological psychologist, as already remarked, starts from the physical states of the body as forming the basis of what we call mind. They have noted the relation of imbecility to defective brain development, and the effect upon memory or consciousness occasioned by blows on the head. They have investigated the influence of ether, mescal and other stimulants and drugs upon the quality of one's ideas. Starting from these admitted facts they have concluded that thought is simply the product of brain function. These thoughts, to be sure, are related to each other, but they are so related because of their relation to the physical organism. The special forms of our thinking are traceable to special sections of the brain. When we think of things we have seen, one part of the brain is active, when of things we have heard, another portion of the brain is at work. The emotional life is occasioned by still other parts of the brain. The success that has thus far attended the investigations along these lines, has inspired the belief that ultimately all the activities of the mind will be explained in terms of brain function and nerve reaction. Mind will then have become a negligible term. If still retained in scientific discussion it will be retained much as we continue to speak of the rising and setting of the sun notwithstanding that astronomy has shown this form of speech to be founded upon an illusion.

The naturalistic view of mind rests upon the assumption that the term function as applied to the mind always means productive function. Consequently it overlooks or ignores the

fact that the word function is ambiguous. It may mean permissive or transmissive function, as James has pointed out in his Ingersoll lecture on Human Immortality. Strictly speaking, as elsewhere indicated, naturalistic science can properly do no more than draw our attention to the fact that brain states are attended by certain mental activities and *vice versa*, the general fact that thinking is attended by the functioning of the brain. To go beyond into either interpretation of the further significance of the functioning process, as to whether it is productive or merely permissive of thought, is to make an incursion into the field of metaphysics. By himself adopting the transmission theory of brain function, James in his Ingersoll lecture allied his psychological views with those of the idealistic philosophy.

3. From the standpoint of absolute idealism the human mind is a manifestation of the Absolute Mind. It exists for the Absolute and in the Absolute. It is the Absolute Mind as finite and imperfect, the Absolute in negative relation to itself, to make use of a strictly Hegelian expression. The Universal Mind, rising above the threshold of human consciousness thus appears at the level of reality which is found in human life. Other idealists, such, for example, as Ormond, regard the human mind as an existent instituted by the Absolute, having a capacity for thought and will of its own and not so completely identified with the Universal Mind as the foregoing statement would seem to imply. In either case the human mind is the imperfect expression of those ideals and capacities which in the mind of the Absolute are perfect and complete.

We have already discussed somewhat fully the individual human mind as an expression of purpose. It is necessary here merely to call attention to a few leading features of that discussion. How the purposes and capacities characteristic of an individual become organized in the life of the child we have no means of knowing. It is evident, however, that not all these purposes within the compass of a mind come to development within the period of a lifetime. The degree of individuality is determined by that the choice of which is most complete and most constantly and persistently pursued, or, if more than one purpose be expressed, by the degree to which each is developed. From the human side, individuality, to the extent in which it is individual, is determined by this purpose to win a unique

place by maturing as fully as possible the chosen end and aim. From the standpoint of the Absolute, as already remarked, the Ultimately Real is thus manifested in the time-space world, and in the relations of human society through the finite mind.

The human mind finds its development not apart from but within relations to physical objects. Its special life and activity are manifested in and through the human body, by means of which it is connected with the physical order. It is in fact through the opposition of the physical world that it becomes aroused to full self-consciousness. By the physical world it is stirred into activity; for when not invited into new lines of endeavor it is goaded into the exercise of its powers in sheer self-defense in order to preserve life and all that it holds dearest, or to promote the welfare of these. The very furnishings of the mind are derived from physical existents. Its imagery is drawn from sense objects. The language which it speaks and by means of which it thinks clearly is permeated with the traces of physical and material things. But these material objects no less than the human mind are maintained by the Absolute Mind. Both are held in their mutual relations by the Over-Soul.

V. *Mutual relations of mind and body.*

1. We have endeavored to reach definitions of body and soul from the idealist's point of view, to consider what each is in itself and in its relations. Their mutual relations have in part been involved in the preceding discussion. Nevertheless it remains to inquire further how they are related to each other. It will readily be admitted that they are causally connected, but how this causal connection exists and acts it is difficult to determine. The view that the soul is, to use Bradley's expression, "a mere adjective depending on the body," a mere effect, we have already found to be unsatisfactory and have in consequence sought for a more adequate definition of mind. On the other hand a complete view of the situation must recognize that the body holds a more vital and organic connection with the mind than is implied by the popular view in regarding it as an attendant of the mind. Nor can the body be considered as a creation of the soul, for physical changes, it would then appear, come from the soul, and as effects of the soul, could not

react upon it. Yet this interaction is one of the facts in the problem to be explained.

2. In seeking to understand the mutual relations existing between mind and body we shall be aided by keeping clearly in view the conclusions already attained. Both mind and body are manifestations of the Absolute at different degrees of reality. Both are maintained by the Absolute in fulfillment of their several functions. They are intimately and most vitally connected with each other.

There are indications, also, that their relations are not parallel. Under certain circumstances the teleological functioning of conation is first in order of time and importance. The will then prevails and draws the body into its service along the line of its endeavor. There are other circumstances in which the habitual reactions of the bodily organization are primary, when the mind is scarcely conscious of what is taking place.

3. The true relation between the body and the mind, it now appears, must be sought in some form of interactionism, not in regarding either as fundamentally the cause of the other. Since neither mind nor body is self-subsistent and independent but both exist for and in the Absolute it will be recognized that this interaction has its ultimate basis within the Absolute Mind. But the full extent of that close interrelation it is not possible to trace in detail. To this conclusion Bradley's discussion in his chapter on Body and Soul also leads. He regards both soul and body as series of phenomena. "Each, to speak in general, is implicated in the changes of the other. Their supposed independence is, therefore, imaginary, and to overcome it by invoking a faculty such as will is the effort to heal a delusion by means of a fiction. A psychical state, once conjoined with a physical may normally restore it; and hence this psychical may be treated as the cause. It is not properly the cause since it is not the whole cause; but it is most certainly an effective and differential condition. The physical event is not the result of a mere physical state. And if the idea or feeling had been absent, or if again it had not acted, this physical event would not have happened."¹ Bradley concludes that in the end no complete explanation of how mind and body act upon each other is possible. "The connection between body and soul is in the end inexplicable,

¹Appearance and Reality, p. 335.

and the further inquiry as to the 'how' is irrational and hopeless."¹ Soul and body he regards as equally unreal in the sense that each is a fragment artificially abstracted from the whole. It is impossible in the end to understand how either comes to exist.

4. It seems fair to conclude, however, that, inasmuch as the Absolute is Mind, the human mind is far more closely related to the Absolute than the body. It is a fuller expression of Reality than any purely physical manifestation can be. It is therefore more fundamental. Aristotle defined the soul as "the first entelechy of an organized body possessing life potentially." To conceive of it in this way is to attribute to it a degree of reality such as would render it capable of surviving the fate of the body. To the same conclusion we are led by best idealistic thought of the present.

The human mind, then, has a definite and characteristic place within the natural order. By virtue of its existence in the body it is incorporated in the order of nature. It may be regarded as nature's finest development, its most perfect fruitage. But if within the natural order it is not wholly within it. It rises above nature. Its fullest life is to be found in the spiritual realm. Its abiding home is with God and in Him.

¹Appearance and Reality, p. 336.

CHAPTER III.

THE LIFE ETERNAL AND THE FLOW OF TIME.

I. Early anticipations of the modern conception of eternal life. The ideas of worth and permanence seeking harmonious expression. Immortality among the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, in the Persian hymns and prayer, and in the Hebrew psalms.

II. The Christian conception. Nature of eternal life. Implications. Man's capacity to receive the divine gift. Over-individual aspects of human life.

III. Eternal life defined with over-emphasis upon value. Spinoza's doctrine of immortality. The conception of Münsterberg: human life beyond time, which like science is a creation of mind; the real personality found in will-attitudes; mind as expression of value is uncaused; relation to the Absolute. Criticism of Münsterberg: obscurity of his doctrine; individuality dissipated in the Absolute; over-emphasis upon value.

IV. Temporal aspect of eternal life. Need of clearer definition. Unreality of time as presented by Taylor. Reality of time, the view of naive realism and pragmatism. Mediating position of Watson. Time a "sublated form of being within a perfected experience." The eternal expresses itself in the temporal, otherwise an abstraction. The eternal life the fulfillment of the present.

I. *Early conceptions of eternal life.*

1. Human life, under any proper conception is something more than bare existence. Merely to exist is not to live. Accordingly the conception of life after death has its deepest motive, not in the desire for continuance growing out of the dread of annihilation, but in the sense of worth, and the attendant feeling that what has the truest value should and does also possess permanence.

These two elements have ever contended for united and harmonious expression. In the best thought of antiquity the worth of life is the theme of the deepest meditations of the noblest minds. The union of the idea of worth with that of duration into the conception of an eternal life, in which the best of the present finds its completest expression, was indeed anticipated in the ancient world but not grasped with full assurance before the Christian Era.

2. Greek philosophy at its best approaches our modern conception of eternal life in an interesting degree. Plato endeavored to understand the world according to a pattern laid up in heaven. His dream of the ideal society was prompted by the desire that righteousness prevail in the social order and in the government of the state. There can be little doubt that in presenting the

proper course for the lover of wisdom, he reflects his own mature thought when he says: "Now he who has become a member of this little band (of true lovers of wisdom) and has tasted how sweet and blessed his treasure is, and has watched the madness of the many, with the full assurance that there is scarcely a person who takes a single judicious step in public life, and that there is no ally with whom he may safely march to the succor of the just * * * —having, I say, weighed all this, such a man keeps quiet and confines himself to his own concerns, like a man who, in a storm of dust and spray driven by the wind, takes shelter behind a wall; and when from his retreat he sees the infection of lawlessness spreading over the rest of mankind, he is well content if he can in any way live his life here untainted in his own person by unrighteousness and unholy deeds, and when the time for his release arrives takes his departure with noble hope and with a serene mind."¹

The future life as conceived by Aristotle is a life of growth, of development, of insight into what in the earthly life was mysterious yet attractive to the inquiring mind ever eager to understand and to know fully the meaning and relations of things. The ardent desire of the Apostle Paul to know fully even as he was fully known was no less that of Aristotle, whose mind, the highest expression of the scientific impulse of his time, possessed little of the mystic and poetic soul, but in its passion for knowledge, sought to include all things. Aristotle's ode to the intellectual life is most significant in that, from the side of pure and consistent thought he has attained to exalted conclusions in regard to God and man's relation to Him, yet has not come to a well-defined conception of an eternal life in conscious fellowship with Him. In the metaphysics he writes: "In this way, however, is the Deity disposed as to existence, and the principle of life is, at any rate, inherent in the Deity; for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life, and God—as above delineated—constitutes this energy; and essential energy belongs to God as his best and everlasting life. Now our statement is this,—that the Deity is a living being that is everlasting and most excellent in nature; so that with the Deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal: for this constitutes the very essence of God."²

¹The Republic, 496 C.

²Metaphysics Bk. XI, Ch. VII, 6 p. 332 M'Mahon tr.

3. Persian thought, at its best, discloses a similar identification of the truest life of man with the knowledge of God. In many of the prayers of the Zend-Avesta we may trace a surprisingly clear conception of human fellowship in the life and eternity of God, as for example in the following: "And do Thou, O Lord, the Great Creator! come to me with Thy Good Mind; and do Thou, who bestowest gifts through Thy Righteousness, bestow alike long-lasting life on us. And that this life may be spent aright, do Thou, by means of Thy lofty words, bestow the needed powerful, spiritual help upon Zarathustra and upon us, whereby we may overcome the torments of the tormentor * * * *."

"That best of gifts, therefore, do I beseech of Thee, O Thou best of beings, Ahura! who art one in will with Thy Divine Righteousness within us, likewise the best of spirits, desiring it as I now do for the heroic man Frashaastra and for me upon whom also may'st Thou bestow it not for time alone but for all the ages of Thy Good Mind, that reign of Thy Benevolence which shall be to us as Heaven."¹

4. How suggestive these sentiments are of many similar thoughts expressed in the Psalms of the Hebrews. from which we select the following:

"Thou wilt show me the path of life;
In Thy presence is fulness of joy,
At Thy right hand there are pleasures forevermore."²

"As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness.
I shall be satisfied, when I awake, in thy likeness."³

"Whom have I in heaven but thee?
And there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee.

My flesh and my heart faileth:
But God is the strength of my heart and my portion
forever."⁴

¹Sacred Books of the East, Ed. F. Max Müller, vol. XXXI. The Zend Avesta, Part III, L. H. Mills, pp. 21-22.

²Psalms 16:11.

³Psalms 17:15.

⁴Psalms 73:26.

II. *The Christian conception of eternal life.*

1. The conception of eternal life finds its most satisfactory expression in the Christian view of man's nature and destiny. In this immortality is everywhere assumed. Life and immortality are brought to light by Christ. And by as much as the fully developed mental and spiritual life surpasses mere physical existence, so the life eternal surpasses the best that is attainable under the conditions of our phenomenal existence in time. Yet the eternal is not unrelated to the present life. It is not a boon received at death or after death. It is on the contrary a present possession. He that believes in Christ, who is in life-fellowship with him,¹ has eternal life now, so that in the Christian conception time and eternity are not true antitheses, but the latter includes the former. Eternal life is God's gift to men, an endowment not earned but bestowed out of His free and abundant favor. It is conferred through the agency of the Holy Spirit who brings conviction of sin, inspires the loathing for sin and awakens new desires in the individual. He presents to the soul the perfect life of Christ and gives aid to pattern after that great example. Eternal life for man, then, means that the divine life dwells in him. It is the union and communion of the human with the divine. It means the subordination of the baser elements and the progressive attainment of our noblest ideals and purposes. That life is not interrupted by death, for death, to the believer, means simply "to depart and be with Christ which is far better"² than the earthly existence. The goal of the eternal life is full likeness to Christ in nature and character. It is that of perfect, unbroken fellowship with Him.

The complete conception of the life eternal is thus seen to be something far richer and fuller than that merely of an immortality of the soul. To its proper conception the immortality of the soul holds much the same relation as the skeleton to the normal, healthy body. It means the survival of death but more. It is the incapability of death. Death has no dominion over it. Immortality is a negative term. The conception of eternal life gives to it positive and concrete meaning, since the latter is a life enriched by the divine life in ever increasing fullness. How that life in eternity shall ultimately be manifested,

¹St. John 5:24.

²St. Paul, Philippians, 1:23.

in what kind of world-surroundings, and through what modes of expression we need not consider here, further than to remark that the conception of life eternal contemplates an environment in harmony with the best aspirations of the soul, through means capable of adequately and perfectly manifesting its full activity.

2. This conception of eternal life implies certain capacities in the individual which render him capable of receiving the offered divine gift. It involves possibilities which may be developed almost without limit. The general temperament is unchanged by the divine gift, but, under the power and influence of the divine, continues essentially that which it was formerly. The same adaptations continue, lifted, indeed, to a higher plane and put to a nobler use than would otherwise be the case. But there is no approximation to a dead level of life, either by a levelling down of the natural endowments of the more gifted, or through a levelling up of the less highly endowed. The natural adaptations of men are simply exercised and developed. In fact, instead of leading to a dead uniformity among men, capacities which would tend to remain latent, perhaps become ultimately lost, are called into healthy exercise. This conception of the life eternal therefore, recognizes that the inherent capacities of men are such as fit them for divine fellowship when they shall have become sufficiently unfolded. That fellowship exists, in truth, even in the temporal life. It restores the divine image in man. It gives promise of even more than the traditional first estate of man; for

"In Him the sons of Adam boast
More blessings than their father lost."

Thus it appears that the idealistic doctrine of human individuality as an organized system of specialized functions and capacities interprets with a considerable degree of accuracy the implications of the Christian conception of immortality.

3. In this conception also the over-individual aspect of human life in regard to moral and spiritual character is even further brought to our notice. The power of God lays hold of something in man not altogether foreign to Himself, although, it is true, Christian teaching has sometimes been so formulated as seemingly to maintain that the human soul is dead toward His influence till made alive by the Almighty power. However, by

this representation is meant a certain powerlessness of the human will rather than an absence of all knowledge of God and assent to the binding character of His will as duty. But when the eternal life has entered through the agency of the Holy Spirit it is to find there as a starting point an elemental moral and spiritual light. "We also are His offspring," declared St. Paul to the the Athenian philosophers upon the Areopagus, quoting approvingly the Greek poet, Aratus. And St. John, frequently assumed to have had the deepest insight into the meaning and teachings of Jesus, presents him as the Eternal Word or Reason through whom all things were made, in whom was life. "And the life was the light of men. * * * There was the true light, even that which lighteth every man, coming into the world."¹ Other passages of similar import might be cited, but these are sufficient to reveal the underlying kinship of the life of man with that of the Eternal. It is a quality of human nature that under the developing influence of the Spirit of God is capable of the highest expression, when all opposition of an estranged will shall have been removed, and the hindering conditions of life in the phenomenal world shall have disappeared. Then our ideals shall find fitting expression, our suppressed purposes will attain proper development, and life be full and complete in God. What that full expression will be we can but faintly realize.

III. *Eternal life defined with excessive emphasis upon value.*

The general Christian conception assumes that the eternal life is the full expression of what is implied in the temporal, under the moulding and guiding influence of the Divine Spirit. It combines the two elements of worth and duration which the ancient philosophers and seers had held in uncertain and imperfect unity. It remains to notice another conception of immortality which so overemphasizes the value of human life as in effect to underestimate it, paradoxical as that may seem. This conception may be seen in Spinoza and in the thought of Fichte as expressed by Hugo Münsterberg in his monograph on *The Eternal Life*.

1. Spinoza teaches that in the highest stage of intellectual development man refers all things to the idea of God. *Mens efficere potest, ut omnes corporis affectiones, seu rerum imagines*

¹Gospel of St. John, 1: 4, 9 R. V.

*ad Dei ideam referantur.*¹ In this state all passion having ceased, feeling and will have become absorbed in the knowledge and love of God. This, the highest kind of virtue, both frees man and confers upon him immortality. This intellectual love of God is independent of bodily states. Consequently the destruction of the body can not affect it. Spinoza speaks rather of eternity, however, than of immortality. By this he means that a thing forms an essential part of the universe, and therefore can not cease to exist. It is a condition into which the soul enters, in which it is above time relations. He apparently does not conceive eternal life as belonging by nature to all men, but regards it as something to be acquired by each one, and as being acquired in different degrees. It is generally questioned whether the immortality of which Spinoza speaks is immortality at all. Spinoza is, indeed, careful to guard against the doctrine that the individual is absorbed in God. In pointing out that in the final state in which man attains his highest unity in God, he at the same time attains the highest consciousness of self, the conclusion appears to be so framed as to convey the impression that while we retain our individuality we shall have no means of knowing ourselves as the same individuals.

2. For Münsterberg also "we are beyond time in the reality of our immediate life."² Time is an idea created by the mind as the form of its objects. If we choose to regard our personality as in time we do so for certain purposes.

Science, equally with time, is the creation of our mind. If the men who hold a scientific view of the world and the men who hold the religious view of the world are found in sharply separated camps we are not to yield too ready an assent to all that science appears to demand. Science is dominated by the category of necessity. However, since it too is the creature of the mind by which to accomplish certain ends, the scientist is greater than his science, and it, therefore, fails likewise to express the reality in which we live. The real personality is beyond these constructions of the mind. Time is here regarded as an order in which the reality of one member excludes the reality of every other. The only time-instant which is real is the present. The past has already become unreal and the

¹Ethica, v. 14.

²The Eternal Life, p. 15.

future will not become real until the present shall have passed away. In this sense our whole life will have become unreal at death. In life considered as a mere series of phenomena there can of course be no value.

The real personality is found in its attitudes and will-acts. It is not to be perceived as a thing. Its true meaning is to be, not a phenomenon, but a will whose acts are valid for ourselves, and from others claim acknowledgment.

One will is related to another directly, through mutual interest, not as scientifically constructed bodies. This mutual interest forms a direct will-connection. Our thoughts and feelings are "judgments, attitudes, volitions which bind one another by their meaning, without relation to time or succession." It is in these universals in which mutual interests are expressed that one will meets another. These interests in which are expressed our acts of will are bound together by a unity of purpose.

It becomes meaningless, therefore, to inquire what came before and what will come after my personal being. My personality was uncaused. It is independent of birth and death. Biological events have no relation to it. It is not born, it will not die. It is immortal, it is eternal. The will is likened to a circle having neither beginning nor end. "It is endless, infinite." If the question of the value of such a life be raised, it is answered, "Only that which is an ultimate end for us is really a value." The true, the beautiful, the moral deed, the intellectual achievement, the work of civilization, religious faith, the repose of philosophic conviction are ends in themselves and are respected as final.¹ But this means that they are more than individual, personal experiences. Our own will is satisfied in them, but at the same time we know our will as more than an individual volition. Our will-acts are then to us "expressions of an absolute will." They are our will-acts, however, "only in so far as we are absolute subjects, in so far as our consciousness is the over-individual consciousness, the Over-Soul."²

The relation sustained by the human will to the absolute will Münsterberg represents as that of "a personality which has found complete satisfaction of its aims" and therefore, "has no possible further intention." To such an one "it would be

¹The Eternal Life, p. 46.

²Ibid, 60.

meaningless to attach externally a supplement of individual existence."¹ In carrying out this thought he refers again to his deceased friend and declares, "you and I do not know a reality of which he is not in eternity a noble part; the passing of time cannot make his personality unreal and nothing would be added to his immortal value if some object like him were to enter the sphere of time again. * * * * If I mourn for our friend I grieve not because his personality has become unreal like an event in time, but because his personality as it belongs eternally to our world aims at a fuller realization of its intention, and at a richer influence on his friends."²

3. The ancient Hebrews thought of the state of the dead as most shadowy. In Sheol there was no remembrance of God, no thought nor device. From quite another starting point Münsterberg comes to a similar obscurity as to whether there is any genuine personal identity of the individual who has passed from the time-space world. He appears to imply such a continuance of personality when he speaks of his grief as resulting, not from any "unreality as of an event in time" having befallen his friend, but because his personality "aims at a fuller realization of its intentions and at a richer influence on his friends." But what is thus implied is destroyed by the force of the earlier statement, "You and I do not know a reality of which he is not in eternity a noble part." He is then a part of truth as such, of beauty, of life, of God. It is further destroyed by the earlier statement, "a personality which has found complete satisfaction of its aims has no possible further intention, and it would be meaningless to attach to it externally a supplement of individual existence."³ This certainly implies surrender of individual being, and submergence in the Absolute.

But inasmuch as we also who remain in the phenomenal world are not in time but beyond it, immortal and eternal, independent of the biological events of birth and death, it follows of necessity that we too are eternal subjects, having our place in the grand symphony. This being true the distinction of the acts of our individual will from the will-acts of the Over-Soul appears devoid of meaning.

In short Münsterberg's conception of the eternal life is too

¹The Eternal Life, p. 62.

²Ibid, pp. 68, 71.

³Ibid, p. 62.

obscure to be of real service. It overemphasizes value and that in such a way that the individuality of man is emptied of true significance. Personality becomes dissipated into the great ideals which have been its inspiration in the earthly state. Nor has he presented an adequate consideration of the time element in the idealism of man. The slurring over of this feature of any conception of eternal life leaves much to be desired in the way of closer analysis of the time process in relation to immortality.

IV. *The temporal aspect of eternal life.*

1. But how are we to conceive of eternal life in relation to the time-process? Spinoza and Munsterberg, as we have seen, have pronounced the time element unreal, a construction of the mind to serve its purposes. Others regard time as the *a priori* condition of sense-perception. In doing so, however, they have presented no satisfying treatment of the situation involved. There is need of a further effort to bring the conceptions of life in time and of life in eternity into harmony with each other in such a way that the truth of neither shall be neglected or ignored.

We shall, perhaps, be better enabled to arrive at a constructive result if we glance first at the opposing views as to the nature of the time-process.

2. From the side of absolute idealism the unreality of time finds an able advocate in A. E. Taylor in his chapter on Space and Time.¹ Time is here considered as perceptual time, on the one hand, and as conceptual on the other. Perceptual time is limited, but is sensibly continuous. It consists not only of a quantitative element, but has likewise a qualitative character which depends on the relation of the *here* and *now* of immediate individual feeling. Conceptual time is constructed out of the data of perception by a process of synthesis, analysis, and abstraction. It is unlimited, is mathematically continuous and is regarded as infinitely divisible. But neither perceptual time nor conceptual time is to be considered real. The former involves reference to the *here* and *now* of finite experience. The latter contains no principle of internal distinction and is therefore not individual. To take time as real, Taylor holds, leads to difficulties about qualities and relations and so to the indefinite regress. There is no principle of unity. The time order

¹Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 241-265.

is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite individuals. It is an inevitable aspect of finite experience. Within the Absolute, it is held, there may be many time orders with no temporal connection. But how time is transcended in the Absolute it is impossible to say.

3. The common sense point of view assumes that time is a real factor in the universe. This position is likewise held by recent pragmatism. It is that put forward by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller in his volume entitled *Humanism*. He regards time as an experiential factor which ultimately rests on the practical necessity of finding formulas for calculating events without waiting to observe their actual happening.¹ If the ultimate explanation of the world be in terms of ends, these must be realized in the time-process and by means of it, since these are individual ends. From this standpoint Schiller urges that a proper metaphysic of the time-process will hold the same relation to the phenomena of history and their explanation as a metaphysic of abstract ideas holds to their explanation by universal laws. The difficulties of the problem are not to be ignored. Yet when it is assumed that a further development of the human mind may lead to a satisfactory solution, the reality of the time-process in which the development takes place can not be denied, and abstract metaphysic becomes indebted to it for the means to solve its difficulties. It is only in the direction of the abandonment of prejudice against the reality of the time-process that Schiller, at least, "can deservy a future for hope, a future for philosophy and a philosophy for the future."²

4. Between these two opposing views of the time-process it should be possible to find a middle way that would keep clear of the extreme consequences of each. The time-process is too patent to be regarded as an illusion. On the other hand if it be considered real, it should be clear in what sense it is so considered. In an able article on *The Absolute and The Time-Process*,³ Prof. Watson takes up the position that the Absolute must be manifested in the time-process, unless the time-process be considered an illusion. In the latter event the very possibility of knowledge would be destroyed. Ultimately the world

¹*Humanism*, p. 104.

²*Humanism*, p. 109.

³*Philosophical Review*, vol. IV, 353, 485.

and the time-process of the finite presuppose a single self-determining principle which is manifested in and through this time-process. The supposition that this self-determining principle can be separated from time would lead to the contradiction that a self-complete Absolute can be independent of its manifestations. Watson defines time as "the universal possibility of events." The only sense in which it can be considered real is as this universal possibility. All reality implies succession. Yet this process of succession can not be treated as substantial. There is no world of events as there is no world without events.

5. It seems fair to conclude, that time not only has a meaning for our minds but that it has a meaning also for the Absolute Mind. We may recognize then that the eternal is in no sense a true antithesis to the temporal, but rather that the former includes the latter in some genuine sense. Had the time-process no meaning for the Absolute it would be difficult if not impossible, so far as we can see, for an orderly cosmos to exist. For if the order of sequence had no significance for the Author of all things man might have appeared in an age of the world utterly unadapted to his normal development, instead of at the culmination of the physical order. Instead of such a coordination of events as occurred, for example, at the appearance of Christianity to introduce the new era upon a world ready to receive it, its significance might have been utterly lost. Instead of geographical discoveries, the revival of learning, the art of printing and the invention of gunpowder occurring at a time when their combined influence served to usher in the modern era, these things would have been distributed so promiscuously that they could not have been the instruments of a mighty progress. But because the time order has a meaning for the Eternal mind, no less than for ours, events are not scattered so promiscuously as to point to no ultimate goal, but, viewed in their larger relations, they are seen as steps in an unfolding progress. Time is "an aspect of the totalizing meaning which pervades and organizes experience," even if "a relatively subordinate" one.¹ The doctrine that regards time as thoroughly subjective and the time-experience as wholly finite has never been consistently or completely

¹E. L. Hinman, *Time as an Absolute Principle of Negativity*, University Studies, vol. VI, p. 7.

carried out. Nor does it appear capable of yielding a conception that is entirely clear. It is most probable that time is a sublated form within a perfected experience. But it is little short of nonsense to attempt to make it appear that time is nothing more than a subjective illusion of the finite consciousness. Time belongs to the larger whole and is organic to it. It is a mode of manifestation of the Absolute. Reality, in certain aspects of its meaning, is beyond the flow of time indeed but in certain others it expresses itself within the time-series. It "partakes of time but denies its power." It is impossible to define time aside from the higher meaning of the timeless, and conversely the timeless or eternal can not be defined independently of the time-process. If it is to be more than an abstraction the eternal must express itself in the temporal.

6. Eternity is involved in man's life. He is formed by the Eternal and for the Eternal. The capacities of his nature speak of fellowship with God. His activities reveal God present within him as the very ground and possibility of all that he does or undertakes, man in God and God in him. Thus does that which is temporal partake of the Eternal and the Eternal expresses itself in that which exists in time. These human capacities are quickened and developed by divine power, so that the desire and prayer of the ancient Hebrew or Greek or Persian, that the worth of human life be combined with true permanence in the Absolute, has a secure basis of fulfillment. Our life is already in eternity. Time "the destroyer" has no real power over it. Not out of relation, therefore, with our present or our past will our future be. It will present the completion of that which the present holds as by promise.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REALITY OF THE IDEAL.

I. The ideals of science and knowledge. Science presupposes a rational order in the world. It results from processes of idealization. Knowledge in any sense is possible only through the activity of the universal mind within thought. How scientific knowledge advances. It is primarily a faith. But the degree of verification of that faith shows the scientific ideal to be a true expression of Reality.

II. Immortality as an ideal of reason. It likewise rests on faith in the rational order of the world. The reasonableness of this faith. The persistence of the belief, it is practically universal. Its cultural value and influence. Influence of this ideal as a social factor in the overthrow of slavery and other forms of servitude; in the creation of asylums for orphans, the aged, blind, insane, and the like; in reformatories, industrial homes and generally in efforts to reform and care for convicted persons; in systems of public instruction, in legislation for regulation of industries and in the efforts to establish international peace. Influence of the ideal of immortality upon poetry and the fine arts. Presence of this ideal in morals and religious movements for reform.

Reality involved in the ideal of immortality as truly as in scientific ideals. The voice of the Most High in favor of the eternity of every human life.

I. *The ideal element in science and in all knowledge.*

1. If we search for the secret of the mighty progress of the present age, we find at bottom the feeling, instinct, or belief that the world is rational and, therefore, interpretable by human reason. The conviction of Kepler that he was thinking God's thoughts after Him well expresses the presuppositions of science universally. For it is because the world displays Mind in every part that the human mind is able to build up its science. Our reason simply interprets for us the Reason displayed in the constitution of things. "If a man should meet a being whose language, signs for thought, and symbols for the world were wholly different from his own, with absolutely no point of contact between them, he would never be able to arrive at any knowledge of that being. Kinship between them existing nowhere, it would be impossible ever to come to a mutual understanding. They would be to one another like the stone faces that stare at each other from the opposite columns of some gate. It would be sphinx looking at sphinx in endless perplexity and everlasting silence. In the same way, if the Infinite by which man's life is surrounded were, like this strange being, an absolute and eternal contrast to humanity, knowledge itself would be im-

possible. One would be permanently unable to discover anything, to find thought in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath; to understand the figure and motion of the globe, the orbits and orders of the stars; to reach any sort of science upon any subject whatever. * * * * * Because we do know men and things; because the world lends itself to thought, melts into the the receptivities of sense, runs into the forms of the understanding, rises into a unity that corresponds to the personal unity of the soul; because the world is an intelligible world, we believe that it is alive with mind, that it is an expression of the Infinite Mind, and that in reading its order we are reaching his plan."¹

2. Science is through and through the result of processes of idealization. To the plain man the world divides itself into the material and the immaterial. But so soon as one gets beyond the most elementary facts and begins to inquire more closely how these same things are constituted, thought takes upon itself a somewhat different form. The matter that seemed so hard and fast, we now learn, is composed of atoms inconceivably minute. Every atom within a given element is like every other atom composing it. But no one ever beheld an atom. The most powerful microscope can not reveal it to our curious gaze. It is in short an ideal creation, a conceptual rather than a purely perceptual existent. Scientists in the last few years have carried out this principle of interpretation of the physical world still farther. The progress of investigation and discovery has tended to show that the atom is not indivisible, as had been supposed, but is in turn made up of electrons. But these, even more if possible than the atom, are metaphysical creations pure and simple. The whole splendid structure of the world which seemed so hard and fast has thus become known to us not directly and as things are in themselves, but indirectly through a process of idealization, the results of which warrant us in concluding that this our knowledge of the elemental forces and materials is, in the main, true.

But not only does idealization enter into our knowledge of the most fundamental characteristics of the inorganic world. We endeavored to point out in a preceding chapter that, in the realm of the organic also, the ideal of the completed organism is the guiding, molding factor in the development of its life, and that

¹G. A. Gordon, *Immortality and the New Theodicy*, pp. 114-116.

every attempted explanation of the principle of heredity assumes this characteristic in some form or other, whether it be under the conception of "the plan of the whole" as involved in the life-bearing particles that go to form the new organism, or whether we speak of "tendency," or "influence" as guiding the process. It is due to the ideal element that no mistakes occur in the forming organism such as would result in parts misplaced or disproportionately developed. This "plan of the whole", this "tendency" or "influence" is as we have seen, in the last analysis, nothing less than the directing activity of the Absolute in whom all ideals exist. They are expressions of the active thought that rules and pervades all things.

3. But these underlying principles of the sciences that propose to interpret the natural world lead to a consideration of questions even more fundamental, connected with the very process of knowledge. How is it that we know things at all? How comes it that we are able to impart and receive knowledge, that a thought may be passed from one mind to another and become intelligible to that other? Is it not due to the same unifying factor that is displayed everywhere in our acquaintance with the world? It is the evidence that within our thinking there is the influence of Another who has so constructed our mental processes and so directs them that thoughts may be transferred from mind to mind by means of intelligible speech. To Him it is alone due that progress in knowledge is possible through arguments that, properly stated, are valid and conclusive for all normal minds.

4. We should consider, in this connection, how it is that genuine progress in scientific knowledge comes to be achieved. Science deals with the facts of experience and with the immediate implications of those facts. It seeks by the method of careful verification to arrive at conclusions incontestably established. Its ideal is the exactness attainable in the mathematical sciences. In consequence of this appeal to experience it is apt to be impatient with views and conclusions which do not yield to this exact scientific test.¹

¹On this ground immortality is sometimes denied. The conclusion of Ostwald, for example, against any true immortality rests upon the premise that we have no experience of immortality. Reduced to syllogistic form, the general argument may be stated thus: Whatever is not involved in our experience is inconceivable; Immortality is not a fact of experience; It is, therefore, inconceivable. Moreover the difficulty of thinking that Creative Power is able to preserve the soul's existence after the brain has ceased its ac-

But whatever be the ideal of science, true scientific progress is made very largely by the method of trial and error. Successive hypotheses are formed which purport to explain facts as known. As other facts are brought to light which tend to weaken or destroy the old theory, a modification of the old or an entirely new hypothesis is introduced to meet the requirements. The planet Neptune was discovered because observed irregularities in the orbits of other planets seemed to require an unknown planet as the most reasonable explanation. Its existence was first of all a surmise, then a well-defined faith, afterward verified. The wonderful discoveries made through the use of the spectro-scope rest upon the belief that the characteristic lines in the spectra are results produced from certain elements known to us to be present in the structure of the earth, but assumed to be present in the sun and stars. In other words the conclusion reached as to the presence of these elements in other bodies of our solar system and in the stars beyond it is mainly a belief, although to be sure a thoroughly reasonable faith. There is no more brilliant illustration of this truth that science rests upon faith, than in the field of biology. The theory of evolution when brought forward was admittedly in advance of the facts to be explained. Several gaps existed in the argument so far as actual verification from known facts was concerned. And these gaps have not all been filled even now. Yet as a working hypothesis it explained the known facts so well, and filled so admirably the intellectual demand for unity that it has led to a reconstruction not only in biology but in every other science. It has likewise found support in subsequent discoveries to such an extent that, instead of losing ground, it is more generally accepted today than ever before. Yet for all that it has been to a large extent a faith, not a fully demonstrated fact.

Through long application to a given subject or field of knowledge there comes to be developed a scientific instinct which leads to further progress in the chosen field. Of these higher instincts within men it has been eloquently said, "Their true history seems to be that they are in us but not of us. They passed through the highways of our life like the wire

tivity is held by many scientists to be such as to amount to a practical impossibility. But the conclusion to which such considerations lead, that because a thing lies beyond experience it is therefore inconceivable and practically impossible, proves too much, and, as Fiske observed, militates in the field of science as well as in that of philosophy.

paths for the electric current in the street; they carry forward with inexhaustible vigor the best work of humanity. But they do not seem to begin or end with this earth."¹

Even aside from the confidence which underlies all knowledge, science therefore, rests upon faith grasping certain ideals. It is rooted in the conviction that the universe reveals rational order and is, in consequence capable of interpretation. The growing development of science occurs first of all through a belief, then through the verification of that belief. But that verification at the same time affords a certain degree of proof that the regulative ideals of science are true expressions of reality. The essential ideals of science are real.

II. *Immortality as an ideal of reason.*

1. Immortality rests upon precisely the same basis as science in this respect. It is a reasonable expectation. Its verification can not be established experimentally, but perhaps what it appears to lose in this respect in the way of absolute certainty is more than made good by the greater universality and persistence of the belief.

It seems fair to conclude that a faith so persistent, involving, as we shall see, the best and worthiest in human life, if rejected as invalid must tend to create distrust of every other development of thought which rests on the principle of faith, including science itself. But on the other hand the degree of verification established in the field of science goes far to establish the presumption that immortality also is the expression of the Real and will ultimately become for each one a fully experienced fact.

2. To some it may seem too large an assertion that immortality has retained a place in the consciousness of men through every grade of civilization. A considerable amount of evidence has been accumulated which purports to show that even at present there exist tribes entirely destitute of the belief. It has been not uncommon that travelers have imagined they had found communities which were without any instinct of a future life. These conclusions have generally been found to have been hastily drawn. In some instances they have been subsequently retracted by their authors. Philosophers, explorers, missionaries, even historians, such men as Darwin, Sir Samuel Baker,

¹Gordon, *Immortality and the New Theodicy*, p. 112.

Moffat, Niebuhr, have shown that it is not difficult to err in observations within this field.¹ Closer acquaintance with tribes believed to be destitute of any beliefs of this character have, in more than one instance, revealed ideas of continued existence even richer than would have been surmised. Instances of this kind have occurred among the tribes of Africa, South America, North America, Australia, and remote islands. Tylor records a curious illustration of this that occurred among the Ahts, a native tribe of Vancouver's Island. A Mr. Sproat spent two years among these people studying their characteristic habits, ways of living and modes of thought before he learned that they had any notion whatever of a future state. He then discovered that they had been striving to conceal from him "a whole characteristic system of religious doctrines as to souls and their migrations, the spirits who do good and evil to men, and the great gods above all."² So many apparent exceptions have broken down under closer and more rigorous investigations that Tylor and other careful students of the subject have concluded that "belief in some sort of existence after death is found to be a catholic belief of humanity."³ And M. Renouf has recorded his judgment that "a belief in the persistence of life after death, and the observation of religious practises founded upon the belief, may be discovered in every part of the world, in every age, and among men representing every degree and variety of culture."⁴

A more recent French writer upon the subject voices the same judgment in somewhat different form: "Cette idée a formé encore le fondement commun des traditions religieuses de tous les peuples qui ont été les éducateurs de l'humanité civilisée, comme les Hindous, les Egyptiens, les Chaldéens ou les Gaulois, et on peut dire en un mot qu'elle résume en elle l'enseignement de la sagesse antique."⁵

3. The precise influence of the belief in immortality upon the development of culture is somewhat difficult to determine owing to its close connection with other beliefs and with religion in general. Yet that it has exerted a profound influence upon human life and conduct will be readily admitted by every

¹S. D. F. Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 12.

²Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, pp. 422.

³Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 10.

⁴Hibbert Lectures 1879, 4th ed. 1897, p. 124.

⁵L. Elbe, *La vie future*, Paris 1905 p. 386.

thoughtful person. The judgment of Elbe concerning the wisdom of the ancients is no less true of the best in modern civilization.

a. We have grown so familiar with that conception which regards the individual as having an eternal worth, that we seldom pause to consider the influence that conception has exerted in undermining institutions hostile to its spirit and in creating new institutions which recognize more fully the eternal value of a life. The well grounded belief that before God every individual is essentially equal to every other leads directly to the conclusion that wealth and rank should confer no title of precedence in civil affairs. The conviction that, before Him, master and slave stand upon an equal footing that "there cannot be Jew and Greek, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman,"¹ has destroyed slavery in the state. It is impossible seriously to entertain such a conviction of the nature and destiny of man without finding that it enters into and molds our views of all human relationships whatever, individual and social. Let the conception become lodged in a sufficient number of minds that, without reference to rank, wealth or social prestige, men stand essentially upon the same level, each with an eternal worth, and sooner or later, from the working out of that principle, every form of servitude as between man and man must disappear. The lot of woman is made more tolerable. That conception of the individual is the bulwark of democracy and, in the field of government, tends to make the private citizen the ultimate ruler in affairs of state. Or let the conception that the human body is the temple of God take possession of a man's thought and he will pay more heed to habits that promote healthy and cleanly living than before. Let it become rooted in a community and it leads to every precaution that is practicable against diseases and vices that ruin and degrade. Or if the logical consequences of the thought that the growing life is taking upon itself a character that is becoming fixed forever be drawn, men begin to see to it that the best possible opportunities be given every child and youth. It is undeniable that our motives for providing higher education within the reach of all, for reclaiming the erring through our system of reformatories and industrial homes,

¹Col. 3:11 (Am. Rev.)

for caring for the orphaned, the blind, the indigent, the feeble-minded and insane, and for reforming prisoners and caring for them when discharged, are not merely utilitarian, having in view one's value to society, but have a deeper root in that essential trait of permanence in life as the result of which each one should have opportunity to develop the best life possible here and now. This conception of human worth is improving the industrial conditions of today, it enters even into international conditions and is a powerful factor toward the prevention of war and the introduction of the era of peace and good will.

b. But the cultural value and influence of immortality is to be traced not only in the institutions which men have reared or demolished under its influence as social need has dictated. It may be traced as clearly also in poetry and the fine arts. And truly the fine arts in themselves have a cultural worth by no means insignificant. Take from poetry that part of it which is concerned with the themes suggested by death and destiny, and the best and most fruitful part of it would be by that act withdrawn. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer not only present their heroes in their deeds of valor, but also portray their death and their state of being after death. Dante's *Divine Comedy* has for its theme the life beyond the present. Milton's great epic treats not only of the earthly life of man but also of his destiny. The great poems of the past century, of Shelley, Browning, Tennyson, Bryant, Longfellow, dwell much on these themes. It was the untimely death of his bosom friend, Arthur Hallam, that moved Tennyson to write his great poem *In Memoriam*, many of whose finest sentiments have become enshrined in the heart of the English speaking race. Quite in the vein of absolute idealism itself are the lines, so often quoted,

“O yet we trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood.

That nothing walks with aimless feet,
That not one life shall be destroyed
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete.”

In short without the themes connected with death and human destiny poetry would, in very large measure, lose its charm and power of appeal.

If it be objected that poetry is inspired by feeling and is, therefore, unworthy of being accepted as a teacher upon the deeper issues of life, it may be sufficient to point out with others that this is no more true of poetry than of other forms of mental life.

But we are under no necessity here to vindicate the method of poetry in attaining its goal. The place of the poet in human culture is unquestioned. His influence is most profound and far reaching. Our purpose is simply to draw attention to the fact that a large part of his noblest, most powerful themes grow out of thoughts connected with the fact of death and its significance for human life.

What is true of poetry is true no less of the fine arts in general. Medieval art in particular drew its inspiration from themes connected with the exalted destiny of man. Even the noblest works of architecture that adorn Europe today, the great cathedrals, point in silent and massive grandeur the toiling, struggling mass of humanity at their base to the true goal of all their hopes and aspirations.

c. It will be worth our while, to consider here more fully the place of the ideal in general within the moral consciousness, for these ideals, rightly interpreted, conduct us to the Eternal. Of these it has been beautifully said, "We do not discover our ideals, they discover us. They take us to the housetop, as Samuel took Saul, and there, in the name of the new day that is breaking, they tell us that we are kings."

The note of permanence that gives confidence to our mental processes in the attainment of knowledge through the working of an Over-Mind is found also in the moral sphere, inspiring a similar confidence. The unity for which the moral nature of man hungers points to its high origin and its ultimate goal. It is grounded in the deepest Reality. It is this fact that gives strength and courage to the moral reformer in the face of the greatest opposition. It is this that inspires him to condemn the existing order as failing to express that which is highest and best and therefore most real.

It was the Real within the moral consciousness which moved

the early agitators for the abolition of slavery. One has but to ask whether it was the defenders of the existing order of things during slavery days, or the agitators for the complete abolition of ownership of human beings, who brought the real into our national life to receive answer in favor of the Abolitionist. The actual does not always represent the real. The ideal, however, as it becomes expressed in human life and affairs does give expression to the real, to that which God ordained and will in the end make actual. It was the real that Cromwell stood for when he sought the emancipation of England. It was the real for which Luther did battle when he fought with heroic energy against the power of pope and emperor. A higher order than the existing one had uttered its voice in his inmost being with such force as to render him indifferent to any fate. That sublime courage in Paul, the Apostle, rendered him not unmindful of the heavenly vision in which he had caught sight of his life work among the Gentiles. Though in constant peril on land and sea, from enemies and false friends, from strangers and his own countrymen, even from fellow Christians of his own nation, none of these things moved him. He had caught sight of a higher order of things, and his great mission was to introduce that new order at all costs. All the advantages which had been his as a Hebrew of the Hebrews, a Pharisee of the Pharisees, as touching the righteousness of the law and zeal for it blameless,¹ as one of the most gifted and most learned of his nation, yet withal enjoying all the rights of Roman citizenship,—all these he counted as refuse for the sake of a higher reality. As yet it was ideal rather than actual. But so impressed was he with the reality of the things which, though unseen, are eternal and so united in oneness of fellowship with God that he is “persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”² No wonder, that under convictions of this kind and with such indomitable courage, the early advocates of the new faith made such inroads upon existing conditions and institutions that old things passed away and a new order, more fully expressing the divine reality, took their place.

¹Philippians 3: 5-12.

²Romans 8: 38-39.

4. In the course of our reflections upon the reality of the ideal we have been led to notice that it is the presence of the ideal element in science that makes it possible and trustworthy and that this ideal operates in and through the faith or confidence that the world everywhere displays the presence and activity of a mind that is cognate to the human mind. The most splendid progress of science has resulted from the leading of that faith or feeling,—or scientific instinct if the term be preferred. In all knowledge we have found this note of permanence grounded in the Over-Mind or Absolute as the basis of our confidence in the knowing process. The extent to which scientific faith has been justified by its degree of subsequent verification creates the presumption that a faith so much more universal and persistent in humanity through all ages and under every degree of culture can not be founded upon an illusion. Nor is a mere illusion capable of producing results so lasting and beneficial to human well-being in the advancing civilization of the race. Beyond estimate is the power of this ideal of immortality not only directly in promoting the lifting up of backward peoples and in the improvement of general social conditions, but also indirectly in its influence upon poetry and the fine arts, many of whose noblest themes are furnished by thoughts of human destiny. In the ideals which impart moral tone and character to life, in constancy of devotion to a great purpose in the face of great opposition, in the feeling of an inward compulsion which leads men to disregard every personal comfort, even life itself, in the struggle to bring nobler and better conditions into human affairs, we rest upon that which is eternal. It is the Ultimate, the Real voicing itself in human life. The ideal of immortality is grounded in the Eternal. It expresses the real no less truly than the ideals of science and knowledge. It is in short "the verdict of the Infinite" within the human consciousness, the voice of the Most High in man's inner being giving sentence in favor of the eternity of every human life.

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